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WHEN IS SEX BECAUSE OF SEX?
"[S]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex. What else could it be
based on?"
-Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in Nichols v. Frank'
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Lois Robinson, a female welder who had worked in a
mostly male shipyard for over a decade, won a judgment against her
employer for sexual harassment.2 Robinson proved that the work at-
mosphere was infested with pornographic pictures and graffiti, which
constituted a "visual assault on the sensibilities of female workers."
3
Male co-workers frequently made graphic sexual comments in front of
Robinson, referring to this plentitude of pornography.4 They put mi-
sogynistic sexual graffiti on the walls in her working areas and made
her the object of sexual comments. 5 Robinson did not allege that any
of this abusive sexual conduct was in the nature of a sexual "overture,"
or that the harassers had a particular sexual interest in her. Yet the
court had no trouble concluding that the harassment was "because of
sex": "[S]exual behavior directed at women will raise the inference
that the harassment is based on their sex."
6
In July 1997, in Doe v. City of Belleville,' an appellate court ruled
that a sixteen-year-old boy, whose male co-workers had subjected him
to sexual epithets, grabbed his testicles, and even threatened him with
rape, had sufficiently established "discrimination because of sex" to
proceed to trial on his sexual harassment claim under Title VII.8 Ac-
cording to the court, there would have been no question that this was
sexual harassment had the plaintiff been a woman, and the court
found it clear that this too was a case of "discrimination because of
sex," notwithstanding that the harassers and the victim were both
42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).
2 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
3 Id. at 1495; see id. at 1495-98 (listing the items creating this visual assault).
4 See id. at 1498 (detailing comments that Robinson testified were made in front of
and to her, including statements such as "[t]he more you lick it, the harder it gets,"
and "I'd like to get in bed with that," and "I'd like to have some of that").
5 See id. at 1499 (quoting the graffiti that contained remarks such as "[1]ick me you
whore dog bitch").
6 Id. at 1522.
7 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
8 See id. at 595 (holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the boy's
gender played a significant role in the harassment faced).
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male.9 In a striking example of plain good sense, the court stated:
"Frankly, we find it hard to think of a situation in which someone in-
tentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons entirely unrelated to
that person's gender."'
Robinson and Doe differ in the obvious respect that the former in-
volved male-on-female and the latter male-on-male, or "same sex,"
harassment. Yet the cases have a common theme and bookend what
was an important advance in sexual harassment doctrine: the recogni-
tion that harassing sexual conduct may be motivated by something
other than sexual attraction toward the victim. Instead, courts were
coming increasingly to the understanding that "why the harassment
was perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? mis-
guided humor? boredom?) is beside the point."" This notion was
embodied in what might be called the "sex per se" rule: that whatever
other conduct might constitute sexual harassment, and whatever
other elements might be required to prove actionable sexual harass-
ment, sexual conduct per se established the "causation" element nec-
essary under Title VII to prove that the conduct was "because of sex."'2
In the year following Doe, the law of sexual harassment underwent
major development in both doctrine and academic theory. Four lead-
ing theoretical articles on sexual harassment by progressive "second
generation" feminist scholars9 "sought to reconceptualize the wrong
of sexual harassment so as to correct conspicuous errors and set the
claim on a sound future course." 4 As the last of these was being pub-
lished, at the end of the 1997-1998 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court is-
sued three opinions on workplace sexual harassment. 5 One of these,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,0 held that a Title VII plaintiff
9 Id. at 580.
10 Id. at 580.
11 Id. at 578.
12 As will be explained further, the term "causation" is used in antidiscrimination
law to refer to an intent requirement rather than, as in tort law, a nexus between the
tortious act and the plaintiffs damages. Infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
13 Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1169 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
445 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998).
14 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1171.
15 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998).
16 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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could state a claim for sexual harassment notwithstanding that the
harasser was of the same sex.' 7 The coincidence of these Supreme
Court decisions and the related works of scholarship suggested "the
arrival of a jurisprudential moment characterized by reinvigorated
theorizing about the appropriate legal response to sexual harass-
ment."1  One federal appellate court paid a noteworthy tribute to
these articles, which "reexamine the theoretical underpinnings of
sexual harassment law," and pronounced that, due to the conjunction
of this scholarship and the Supreme Court rulings, " [w] e are witnesses
to the birth of a second generation of sexual harassment law."' 9
Ironically, in the aftermath of these significant developments it is
no longer clear-as it was prior to 1998-that a man or a woman who
experiences severe or pervasive sexual epithets, crotch-grabbing, or
even threatened rape has experienced "discrimination because of
sex." In attempting to reconceptualize sexual harassment, both the
second generation theorists and the Court reopened the question of
causation and disturbed, if not rejected, the unquestioned assumption
that sexual conduct in the workplace is per se "because of sex."
Second generation sexual harassment scholarship is characterized
by efforts to solve various problems coming under the label "essential-
ism," which, in the context of sex discrimination, is the troublesome
notion that womanhood is a monolithic concept, and that there is a
single problem of sex discrimination that can be solved by a unified
solution.' ° For several years, feminist scholars have sought to advance
beyond the classic antisubordination theory that Catharine MacKin-
non articulated in Sexual Harassment of Working Women.21 While ac-
17 Id. at 79. The other two opinions on workplace sexual harassment, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), dealt with employer vicarious liability. A fourth decision dealt with a school's
liability for a student's claim of hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX.
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (holding that dam-
ages may not be received for teacher-student sexual harassment in an implied private
action under Title IX unless certain school district officials have notice of and are de-
liberately indifferent to the teacher's conduct).
is Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Abrams, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1245,1245 (1998).
19 Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
Abrams, Bernstein, Franke, and Schultz).
20 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585-90 (1990) (defining and critiquing "gender essentialism"); Kathryn
Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH L. REV. 2479, 2485-87 (1994)
(same).
21 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon's antisubordination theory holds that
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knowledging the great debt owed to MacKinnon and sharing her cen-
tral idea that sexual harassment perpetuates the subordination of
women in the workplace, the second generation theorists move away
from MacKinnon's essentialism. In particular, these second genera-
tion scholars diverge from her underlying thesis that male sexual con-
duct inherently subordinates women-that male sexuality "is always,
already sexist."
22
In Oncale, a unanimous Supreme Court cast doubt on the sex per
se rule, stating that "[w]e have never held that workplace harassment,
even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimi-
nation because of sex merely because the words used have sexual con-
tent or connotations."2 3 In so doing, the Supreme Court reexamined
the question of causation, but conspicuously declined to adopt the
feminist theorists' antisubordination commitments. While Oncale, on
the surface, was a victory for the plaintiff, the Court went out of its way
to avoid endorsing a theory of harassment on account of gender non-
conformity and, in so doing, narrowed the avenues by which female
plaintiffs in the most common sexual harassment cases can prove cau-
sation. At the same time, the Oncale Court embraced a sexual desire
theory of causation that can be turned against gays and lesbians.
The second generation theorists, in effect, had invited the courts
to reopen the question of causation in sexual harassment cases in or-
der to solve the problems of essentialism: to embrace a prohibition
on harassment on account of gender nonconformity, to broaden the
understanding of harassment to include nonsexual but subordinating
conduct, and to eliminate paternalistic "anti-sex" attitudes that surface
in occasional harassment decisions. The Oncale decision joins the sec-
ond generation theorists in breaking down an unexamined but useful
consensus that was beginning to emerge among courts and the older
theories of sexual harassment; namely, that sexual conduct is per se
because of sex. But it does so without giving us the world the second
generation theorists were looking for: proof of causation may now be
more difficult for the H. Does and the Lois Robinsons. Thus, while it
may be that the courts have accepted the invitation, they seem deter-
discrimination produces and reinforces an existing caste system of race and sex, with
white men in the privileged position, in contrast to formal equality theory, which views
Title VII's prohibitions against sex (and race) discrimination strictly in sex-blind (and
colorblind) terms. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the antisubordination theory of sex
discrimination).
22 Franke, supra note 13, at 762.
23 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
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mined to behave badly at the party.
It should come as no surprise that the Court in Oncale failed to
pursue the antisubordination agenda once it reopened the question
of the meaning of discrimination "because of sex." In this, Oncale ex-
poses a problem in the antisubordination theories of sexual harass-
ment themselves. Courts have always taken seriously the question of
"causation" in employment discrimination law: the element of proof
that an otherwise lawful workplace act is "because of' sex, race, or the
other prohibited grounds. But recent antisubordination theorists may
have paid insufficient attention to causation, particularly to the need
to define "because of sex" in a way that bridges their theories to the
doctrine in the courts.
In Part I of this Article, I examine what I call the "sex per se" rule.
To trace its development in sexual harassment caselaw and explain
the doctrinal function that it has fulfilled, I first examine the issue of
causation in employment discrimination law. In cases of intentional
discrimination, courts have always required some proof that the al-
leged discriminatory conduct was "because of' race/sex/etc. This
"causation" element, which refers to proof of a conscious discrimina-
tory intent, serves a gatekeeping function to distinguish discriminatory
from presumptively lawful conduct. In harassment cases involving
sexual conduct, however, the sex per se rule has emerged as an evi-
dentiary shortcut, relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving the
harasser's motivation in targeting the plaintiff.
In Part II, I analyze the Oncale decision and its potential conse-
quences. Although the plaintiff "won" in the Supreme Court, the im-
plications in the opinion for this plaintiff on remand placed him in
more of a losing position. Moreover, the ambiguous quality of the
opinion extends to sexual harassment law more generally. While the
opinion seems on one reading to open new opportunities for includ-
ing broader categories of sexual harassment claims and claimants, it
simultaneously creates the likelihood of retrenchment. The opinion
seems to do away with the sex per se shortcut to proof of causation,
thereby making it more difficult for many plaintiffs to prove that the
harassment was "because of' sex. At the same time, Oncale fails to ex-
tend the protection of Tile VII antiharassment doctrine to gays and
lesbians. In important respects, Oncale looks more like a "reverse dis-
crimination" case than a decision that furthers the rights of tradition-
ally subordinated claimants.
In Part III, I examine three of the leading works of second genera-
tion sexual harassment theory, each of which abandons the sex per se
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rule as it moves away from MacKinnon's underlying thesis that male
sexual conduct inherently subordinates women. For Katherine
Franke and Vicki Schultz, rejecting the "sexuality equals sexism" as-
pect of MacKinnon's work requires them to reject the notion that
harassing conduct can be "because of sex" merely because it is sex-
ual. 4 While Kathryn Abrams is very committed to keeping new theo-
ries of sexual harassment connected to their traditional roots, she
nevertheless does not identify a sex per se rule as something worth
preserving from attack. 5 I argue that the authors' rejection of the sex
per se rule is not necessary to achieve their desired goals. Yet, reject-
ing the sex per se rule imposes a cost by compounding proof prob-
lems for plaintiffs and excluding claims by some of the very plaintiffs
they seek to protect-like Joseph Oncale himself.
In Part IV, I analyze what I believe to be the source of the problem
that has led feminist antisubordination theorists to overlook the value
of the sex per se rule. Antisubordination theorists often give short
shrift to the problems inherent in the causation issue in antidiscrimi-
nation law by overlooking the law's distinction between conscious and
unconscious intentional discrimination. At the same time, antisubor-
dination theorists have not fully appreciated the need to make textual
arguments in addressing their theories to courts. I argue that the next
stage of theoretical work on sexual harassment by feminist scholars
24 See Franke, supra note 13, at 715 ("It is... disingenuous to answer that sexual
harassment is conduct 'because of sex' by arguing that the 'sex' ... refers to a class of
human activity and not the identity category."); Schultz, supra note 13, at 1689 (chal-
lenging the sexual desire-dominance paradigm, which encompasses this rule).
See Abrams, supra note 13, at 1223 ("The based-on-sex requirement, as Franke
skillfully demonstrates, needs substantial revision."). Abrams's critique, it should be
noted, was aimed at Franke's What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment? and Anita Bern-
stein's Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect. Bernstein's important and thought-
provoking article proposes replacing the "reasonable person" (or "reasonable
woman") standard for evaluating the objective "severity" of the harassing conduct with
a "respectful person" standard, which would focus the factfinder's perspective on the
harassing conduct rather than the plaintiff's reaction to it. Bernstein, supra note 13, at
482-506. Bernstein's article differs from the others in its focus on the "severity ele-
ments" rather than the "causation" element of a sexual harassment claim. Infra notes
152, 283-84 and accompanying text. Therefore, Bernstein's argument, for the most
part, falls outside the scope of mine. Bernstein herself distinguishes her focus as "nar-
row" compared to Franke's "ambitious reconception of sexual harassment." Anita
Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231, 1232
(1998).
Additionally, while Abrams apparently wrote The New Jurisprudence before having a
full opportunity to review Schultz's Reconceptualizing, she found her own views to be
consistent with those of Schultz, which she briefly mentions favorably. Abrams, supra
note 13, at 1171 n.7.
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should be to explain the term "because of' in Title VII's text in terms
broad enough to include unconscious intentional discrimination.
Finally, in Part V, I advocate a revival of the sex per se rule. The
sex per se rule is a highly useful pragmatic tool for dealing with causa-
tion that can serve antisubordination purposes; it should not be aban-
doned by feminist scholars. Far from an example of judicial laziness,
the sex per se rule is justified on both theoretical and textual grounds.
On a practical level, it provides a useful means of avoiding a needlessly
complex and difficult inquiry into causation for those cases involving
sexual conduct. At the same time, it can help resolve, for the subset of
cases involving sexual conduct, the causation issue in cases of both
"same sex" and so-called "equal opportunity" harassers-cases that
continue to perplex courts in the wake of Oncale.
I. THE "SEX PER SE" RULE AND THE CAUSATION INQUIRY IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT DOCTRINE
What I call the "sex per se" rule is a doctrine, developed both in
the courts and in public understanding, that sexual conduct in the
workplace, if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive, is discrimination because
of sex. The sex per se rule does not mean that sexual conduct is
automatically sex discrimination. Rather, it is addressed only to the
causation element of a sexual harassment claim. Under a sex per se
rule, sexual conduct in the workplace is always, without more, "be-
cause of sex."
The sex per se rule has functioned, therefore, as an evidentiary
and conceptual shortcut to a detailed inquiry into discriminatory in-
tent (called "causation" in antidiscrimination law)-an inquiry made
problematic by inherent ambiguities in the relevant statutory lan-
guage and in the concept of discrimination itself. The sex per se rule,
which has only ever gained partial acceptance in the courts, in effect
lightens a plaintiffs burden of producing evidence on the causation
element.
In this Part, in order to establish some conceptual clarity, I begin
by looking at two confusing issues bedeviling sexual harassment law:
first, the confusion in the categories of sex, sexuality, and gender that
underlies most contemporary discussion of sex discrimination; and
second, the inherent ambiguity in the notion of discriminatory "in-
tent," or "causation." I then trace the advent of the sex per se rule in
sexual harassment cases.
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A. Sex, Sexuality, and Gender
The law of sex discrimination reflects a great deal of confusion
among the concepts and terminology of sex, sexuality, and gender.
"[T]he term 'sex' when used in the law often means any one or a
combination of the following: biological sex (female or male), core
gender identity (woman or man), gender role identity (feminine or
masculine), or sexual behavior (genital or reproductive behavior)."26
Recent feminist and queer theorists have sought to establish analytical
clarity among these concepts, and the law would benefit by trying to
follow their lead. I will do my own very modest part simply by trying
to define the terms and make some of the relevant distinctions.
Following a number of leading scholars, I believe that the term
"sex" should properly refer to the two biological sex categories typi-
cally assigned at birth based on anatomical and physiological distinc-
tions, and that "gender" should mean the social and cultural under-
standings derived from sex.27  "Sexual orientation" refers to the
human inclination "toward affectional intimacy with members of one
particular sex or of both sexes."2 s By "sexual behavior" or "sexual
conduct," I mean physical sexual acts or communicative acts depicting
sexual acts. "Sexuality" is a blanket term that includes both sexual
orientation and sexual behavior.
Sex discrimination caselaw tends to use the terms "sex" and "gen-
der" interchangeably.29 With the notable exception of sex-
26 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
27 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Ef-
feminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995); see also
Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the
Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 394 (2001) (de-
fining sex as "whether a person is anatomically male or female" and gender as
"whether a person has qualities that society considers masculine or feminine"); Fran-
cisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6
nn.5-6 (1995) (defining "the term 'sex' as denot[ing] a physical attribute of humans"
and defining the term gender as "signiffying] the social or cultural dimensions derived
from and determined by sex").
28 Valdes, supra note 27, at 6 n.7.
29 Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) ("[T]estimony
focused not only on the overtly sex-based comments of partners but also on gender-
neutral remarks." (emphases added)), and id. at 237 (referring to prohibited bases of
discrimination under Title VII as "gender, race, national origin, or religion" (emphasis
added)), with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination because of "race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin" (emphasis added)). Mary Ann Case has suggested that the Court's
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In sexual harassment cases, there has been some confusion be-
tween sex and sexuality. For example, Vicki Schultz has shown how
nonsexual, but sex-based harassment has been eclipsed from judicial
view even though Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of sex"
rather than discrimination "by sexual means."3 Nonsexual harassing
conduct has been called "sex-based" harassment or even, somewhat
confusingly, "gender harassment" in order to distinguish it from har-
assment by means of sexual conduct.34 A source of confusion is, of
course, the word "sex" itself, which means both biological sex assign-
ment and sexual conduct, as in "to have sex." The confusion is com-
pounded by the frequent use by courts of the phrase "sexual discrimi-
nation," in which they apparently mean the word "sexual" to be the
adjectival form of the biological sex assignment meaning of the word
"sex. ," 35
The conceptual confusion among this triad of sex, sexual orienta-
tion, and gender extends to a number of other issues that relate only
tangentially to my argument. For example, courts presented with this
issue typically have conflated "effeminacy"-feminine behavior or
presentation by men-which is a matter of gender, with sexual orien-
tation, thereby wrongly assuming that effeminate men are necessarily
sexually oriented toward men.36
These confusions have undoubtedly played a role in the develop-
ment of the sex per se rule. Although (as I will argue) the sex per se
rule is theoretically justifiable, the notion that sexual conduct is "be-
cause of sex" follows for many judges from the notion that men, who
are presumptively heterosexual, only direct sexual conduct toward
women, whereas sexual conduct by apparently heterosexual men di-
stereotyping).
33 Infra Part III.A.
34 E.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997).
35 See, e.g., Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (character-
izing disparate treatment claim based on sex but not involving sexual harassment as a
claim of "sexual discrimination"). A LEXIS search for the phrase "sexual discrimina-
tion" as of April 29, 2002, would have called up in excess of 1000 cases.
36 See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 327 (reporting Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School as a
consolidated action and concluding that "homosexuals are not a 'class' within the
meaning of§ 1985(3)" in a claim of discrimination based on the failure to comply with
stereotypical gender-role expectations); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325,
330 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the dismissal of sex discrimination claims because
"[t) here was no showing that Smith was a member of any class beyond the 'effeminant'
[sic] group"); Case, supra note 27, at 46-61 (discussing how Smith and Strailey conflate
discrimination on the basis of effeminacy with sexual orientation discrimination); Val-
des, supra note 27, at 138-44 (describing Smith as "the first Title VII ruling expressly on
the conflationary association of sex and gender with sexual orientation").
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stereotyping cases, courts rarely distinguish between biological sex as-
signment and gender identity or gender roles.3° Undoubtedly, this is
based on the unexamined assumption that biological sex and gender
go together naturally. To be sure, the distinction need not be made
in order to reach the proper decision in many, perhaps most, sex dis-
crimination cases.
Sexuality in discrimination law is understood either as a motiva-
tion for sex-based behavior-sexual conduct is motivationally directed
toward persons of a particular sex, depending on the actor's sexual
orientation-or as a status to determine entitlement to the law's pro-
tection. Specifically, discrimination on account of "sexual orienta-
tion" has been held to fall outside of Title VII's prohibition of sex dis-
crimination, with the result that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, who
bear the brunt of such discrimination," are typically unprotected by
current Title VII doctrine.32
common usage of "gender" in sex discrimination cases results largely from Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's efforts as an academic and litigator in the 1970s to substitute the word
"gender" in order to "ward off distracting [i.e., sexual] associations" with the word
"sex." Case, supra note 27, at 10.
30 But seeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination rather than (as the Court
does) gender discrimination.").
31 There can be no serious question that sexual orientation discrimination falls
predominantly upon gays, lesbians, and bisexuals; while the occasional charge of "re-
verse" sexual orientation discrimination against heterosexuals is little more than the
rare but newsworthy "man bites dog" story. In one study of professionals in specific
U.S. cities, "between 27 and 68% of self-identified lesbians and gay men surveyed re-
ported [having experienced] employment discrimination at some point during their
lives." M.V. Lee Badgett, Vulnerability in the Workplace: Evidence of Anti-Gay Discrimina-
tion, ANGLES (Inst. for Gay & Lesbian Strategic Studies, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1997, at 1.
Widespread employment discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals appears
to be reflected in lower wages: lesbians earn approximately eighteen percent less than
heterosexual women, and gay/bisexual men earn seven percent less than their hetero-
sexual counterparts. M.V. Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,
48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 726, 733 (1995).
32 See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2000) (evaluating legislative
history and caselaw to conclude that claims of same-sex sexual harassment motivated
by the victim's sexual orientation rather than her sex "remains non-cognizable under
Title VII"); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Tide
VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual orienta-
tion."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals."); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the appellant's argument that
Congress intended Title VII to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation). But see Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-61
(1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting that although Tite VII does not prohibit discrimination
against sexual orientation, it may reach a similar result through its prohibition of sex
170720021
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rected toward other men is not really sexual. The attack by second
generation sexual harassment theorists on this muddled and readily
falsifiable assumption has contributed to the demise of the sex per se
rule.
B. Causation and Intent in Title VII
When courts or commentators discuss whether an act of harass-
ment is "because of sex," just as when they discuss whether an adverse
employment decision is "because of race" or one of the other enu-
merated grounds of prohibited discrimination, there is a great likeli-
hood that the discussion will either be misunderstood or analytically
faulty. The reasons for this include inherent ambiguities in the
phrase "because of' as well as difficulties inhering in the meaning of
discrimination itself. By making these conceptual difficulties explicit,
we can begin to see both why the sex per se rule arose and how it
functioned in sexual harassment doctrine.
1. The Ambiguous Meanings of "Discrimination" and "Because of'
The operative "antidiscrimination" language of Title VII appears
in Section 703(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
The phrase "because of' implies a causal connection between the em-
ployer's action and the employee's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. But the statute does not specify whether the causal role
of the prohibited factors should be a consciously racist or sexist mo-
tive or something else-perhaps even something not "intentional" at
all. What is clear, however, is that causation-which surfaces in the
caselaw as a "causation requirement" or causal "element" of a plain-
tiff's discrimination claim-fulfills a gatekeeping function, allowing
courts to distinguish actions prohibited by Title VII from those which,
though harmful from the employee's point of view, would be legally
permissible. An ordinary personnel decision, or even an act of har-
assment, that is not "because of' one of Title VII's prohibited grounds
does not violate the statute.
37 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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Calling this step in the discrimination law analysis "causation" is
arguably something of a misnomer; in any event, it is not the same as
causation in tort law. The causation question posed in tort cases is
whether the defendant's negligent or intentional act caused damage
to the plaintiff. In discrimination cases, the relationship between the
defendant's action and harm to the plaintiff is usually not in contro-
versy. Rather the question is whether the "cause" of the defendant's act
was the protected characteristic of the plaintiff; put another way, cau-
sation in discrimination cases asks whether the harm to the plaintiff
was discriminatory in nature.
In so-called "disparate treatment"-i.e., intentional discrimina-
tion-cases, causation is really another way of framing the question of
intent to discriminate." Here, the Title VII causation inquiry has
been variously formulated. Sometimes the courts have used a "but
for" test: whether the allegedly discriminatory decision affecting the
plaintiff would "pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows
'treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex
would be different.' - 9 In other cases, the courts require proof that
"the [employment] decision was in reality racially premised."
40
An ambiguity has arisen in the caselaw concerning "how much" of
the employment decision has to be shown to have been race- or sex-
based to prove discrimination. In the classic McDonnell Doug-
las/Burdine framework for "pretext" cases,4' the parties litigate the
"real" reason for the contested employment decision: the plaintiff
must prove "that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 4' The
38 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1988) ("When, therefore,
an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a de-
cision, that decision was 'because of' sex.").
39 City of L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (quot-
ing Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971), and Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1205 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens,J., dissenting)); see also Int'l Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (concluding that Johnson Controls' policy
does not pass the test enunciated in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683
(1983) (applying the "but for" test and positing that provision of complete health in-
surance coverage to dependents of female employees, and no coverage to dependents
of male employees, would fail such a test).
40 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1993) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,805 n.18 (1973)).
1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tex. Dept. of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
42 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting
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premise of these cases is that an employment decision is motivated ei-
ther by discrimination or by something else, but not by a combination
of the two. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court recognized an al-
ternative "mixed motive" framework, in which a plaintiff could prove
discrimination where the employment decision comprised both dis-
criminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons. 3 Congress, in amending
Title VII in 1991, codified this "mixed motive" framework by provid-
ing that a plaintiff can prove discrimination by showing that the im-
permissible consideration of race or sex "was a motivating factor for
any employment practice."44 Strangely, the selection of a "pretext"
versus a "mixed motive" framework is made to turn, not on the reali-
ties of human motivation, but rather on the happenstance of whether
the evidence of discrimination is deemed "direct" or "circumstan-
tial."45 For present purposes, the main point is that prevailing law re-
quires that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent, understood in
terms of the motive of the decisionmaker or harasser.6
Although we now have a rather vast body of caselaw striving to ex-
plain the ins and outs of these versions of causation (i.e., discrimina-
tory intent), there remains a dearth of real understanding of what dis-
crimination itself means. Is it differential treatment of male and
female, or white and black employees? Or must the discrimination be
"invidious"? The cases point in various directions. The stock-in-trade
of intentional discrimination cases is comparative evidence; in order
to succeed, one needs to show that a similarly situated employee not
in the plaintiffs group (a man in a sex discrimination case brought by
a woman, or a white employee in a race discrimination claim by an Af-
rican-American employee, for instance) was treated more favorably
than the plaintiff. There are two overlapping, but distinct, ways to
view comparative evidence. One is to equate comparative evidence
with discrimination in itself. For example, Justice Ginsburg's dictum
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
43 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-47.
44 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1994). In Price Waterhouse, the Court went on to hold that an employer could defeat
liability by proving it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the im-
permissible factor. 490 U.S. at 258. This aspect of the decision was overruled by the
1991 Civil Rights Act, which held that the so-called "same decision defense" would not
defeat liability, but only limit the plaintiffs remedies. Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m).
45 See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 579-81 (1994)
(concluding that "direct evidence is the touchstone for mixed motive analysis").
46 Infta Part I.B.2-3.
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in her concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems raises just this implica-
tion: "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."47
Moreover, the generally accepted doctrinal label for "intentional dis-
crimination" is "disparate treatment,"48 which naturally implies treat-
ing similarly situated men and women (or whites and nonwhites) dif-
ferently.
49
But there is another way to view comparative evidence. If the
critical issue in discrimination cases is whether race or sex was a "mo-
tivating factor," then proof of differential treatment is reduced to the
role of circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Two employ-
ees, one black and one white, or one male and one female, are similar
in all respects, but one gets preferential treatment over the other.
This is said to raise an inference of discrimination. The Supreme
Court described the function of circumstantial evidence in pretext
cases in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters-
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, espe-
cially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for reject-
ing an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the em-
ployer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we
generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race.50
The intellectual exercise of finding the employees to be "similarly
situated" is another way of eliminating the nondiscriminatory reasons:
if the employees are not similarly situated, then there is a nondis-
criminatory reason for treating them differently, but if they are simi-
larly situated, then there can be no such nondiscriminatory reason.
We are left with the inference that "more likely than not" the reason
for the employment decision is discrimination.
True enough, this second, "comparative evidence" approach is so
pervasive a method for proving discrimination that it is easy to substi-
tute it for the wrong of discrimination itself. The equation of these
47 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
48 See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153 ("The ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was
the victim of intentional discrimination.").
49 The term "disparate treatment," which the Supreme Court first used in a Title
VII case in Geduldigv. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501-02 (1974), does not appear in the text of
the statute.
50 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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two concepts does not matter in the ordinary case where there are
white or male "comparators," but it can raise serious proof problems
for the plaintiff where there are no comparators in the relevant work
unit.
While courts and commentators often assume that discrimination
is the same as comparative evidence of differential treatment, no case
has in fact held that comparative evidence is always required to prove
discrimination. Cases that expressly focus on the need to prove dis-
criminatory intent often look to other forms of evidence, one com-
mon form of which, of course, consists of sexist or racist remarks,
which are taken to reflect the discriminatory animus of an employer.5
Courts rely on such evidence, in part, because there may not always be
comparative evidence. A plaintiff may find herself targeted by virtue
of her race or sex under circumstances unprecedented for that em-
ployer; or perhaps the entire work unit consists of a single sex or ra-
cial group. Joseph Oncale, for instance, worked in an all-male envi-
ronment. Or, it may be that comparisons to other employees simply
make no sense. In Price Waterhouse, the Court concluded that.'denial of
plaintiffs promotion to partnership because of her insufficiently
feminine demeanor was virtually direct evidence of sex discrimination
because it relied upon obviously stereotypical views of women that
worked to limit their employment opportunities.52 There was no dis-
cussion of "comparative evidence," in the sense of male comparators
who also received partnership evaluations. What, after all, would the
51 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
(finding that sex-specific remarks showing hostility to women in the workplace is one
type of proof that harassment is "because of sex"). Courts have viewed racist or sexist
remarks as arrayed on a spectrum with "circumstantial" evidence at one end and "di-
rect" evidence on the other. Where the remark falls on that spectrum depends on the
closeness of the connection between the remarks and the discriminatory personnel
decision: whether the remarks were made by the allegedly discriminatory decision-
maker, about the plaintiff, or in reference to or at the time of the decision. E.g., Fer-
nandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1999). These "fac-
tors" for determining whether remarks are "direct" or "circumstantial" evidence derive
from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277
(1988) (O'ConnorJ, concurring). If the evidence is deemed "direct," then the plain-
tiff is entitled to the more favorable Price Waterhouse "mixed-motive" framework for
proof rather than the McDonnell Douglas "pretext" framework. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at
579-81. Arguably, the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is some-
what arbitrary, since the evidence almost never consists of an admission of race- or sex-
based decisionmaking. Moreover, as Judge Posner has observed in this context, "all
knowledge is inferential." Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir.
1991) (en banc).
52 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273.
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proper comparison have been? Male partnership candidates who
were promoted despite their lack of feminine traits? Or male partner-
ship candidates who were promoted despite their having feminine
traits (gender nonconformists)? Such comparisons raise absurdities,
and in any event were unnecessary because proof of the stereotype
showed that Ann Hopkins' sex was "a motivating factor" in the deci-
53sion.
And yet, the concept of discrimination, based as it is on a founda-
tion of equality, contains some kind of implicit comparison that may
be unavoidable. The notion of men being treated better surely ex-
isted in Price Waterhouse, not as "comparative evidence," but as a
broadly understood background truth that most men are not denied
opportunities due to their failure to conform to gender stereotypes;
whereas women often can find their job opportunities frustrated both
if they deviate from prevailing female stereotypes and if they conform
to them. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not inherently re-
quire proof that a terminated female employee was replaced by a
man, was terminated instead of a man, or was terminated for reasons
for which a man was retained. Similarly, there are cases recognizing
that discrimination may be proven even if the plaintiff was replaced by
54someone in the same protected group. It may be that a proper un-
derstanding of discrimination requires the law to allow the compari-
son to be with a hypothetical or idealized comparator, rather than an
actual co-worker.
2. Conscious and Unconscious Intent
Title VII doctrine divides discriminatory acts into two categories:
intentional discrimination, known as "disparate treatment," and unin-
tentional discrimination, known as "disparate impact."55 Adopted by
the Supreme Court in 1971, and confirmed by Congress in subse-
53 Id. at 287.
54 See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 308 (1996) (reject-
ing the argument that the replacement of the plaintiff by another person over forty
defeated the inference of age discrimination); Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191
F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[S]even of the eight federal courts of appeals to have
addressed it have held that a plaintiff need not prove, as part of her prima facie case,
that she was replaced by someone outside of the relevant class.").
55 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
.56 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation").
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quent amendments to Title VII,57 disparate impact theory holds that
actionable discrimination may arise out of facially sex- or race-neutral
employment practices that disproportionately weed out women or ra-
cial minorities from employment opportunities.5 No showing of an
intent to discriminate need be made. If the plaintiff can demonstrate
the disparate impact, usually through statistics, then the burden shifts
to the employer to show that the practice is "consistent with business
necessity."
5 9
Most employment discrimination cases are based on disparate
treatment theory, alleging intentional discrimination. Yet, the notion
of discriminatory "intent" in Title VII has been remarkably underana-
lyzed and undertheorized. The prevailing understanding of inten-
tional discrimination is that the defendant must be shown to have
consciously targeted the plaintiff for disadvantageous treatment be-
cause of her race or sex. Although some cases seem to acknowledge
the idea of "unconscious" discrimination, there has been little or no
doctrinal or theoretical recognition by courts of unconscious but in-
tentional discrimination. Instead, as Linda Krieger has shown, most
courts assume that discrimination is the result of a conscious choice by
a self-aware decisionmaker-someone who knows he is discriminating
because of race or sex.6O
The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework's focus on the em-
ployer's "true" reason for the employment decision plainly assumes
the existence of a reasoned, self-aware decision-making process.61
57 Title VII § 703(k)(1) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (A) (i).
For example, a height or weight requirement may have a disparate impact on
women. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 322 (1977) (upholding a statute set-
ting minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards while nonetheless
recognizing the statute's disparate impact on women). A standardized test instrument
may have a disparate impact on minorities. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
442 (1982) (holding that an employment test that was not job related and resulted in
excluding a disproportionate number of black applicants constituted employment dis-
crimination). To date, no case has recognized a claim for "reverse disparate impact,"
that is, a claim that a facially neutral practice tends to weed out a disproportionate
number of whites or men.
59 Title VII § 703 (k) (1) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (1) (A) (i).
60 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1166-86
(1995) (analyzing court opinions from Title VII cases and describing assumptions that
courts make about what motivates intergroup discrimination).
61 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
("[O]nce the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be
the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position
to put forth the actual reason for its decision." (emphasis added) (citing Furnco Constr.
20021 1715
1716 UNI VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1697
Similarly, in mixed-motive cases, despite the more realistic recognition
that a single human action results from a multiplicity of motives, the
assumption of conscious discrimination remains. The plaintiff must
prove that the employer "relied upon sex-based considerations in
coming to its decision," which reflects a conscious discriminatory in-
tent: "if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those rea-
sons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. 62 Even
though the courts acknowledge that the employer who unlawfully dis-
criminates is unlikely to give a truthful, answer to that question, the
evidence demanded in both the pretext and mixed-motive frame-
works is still aimed at finding that answer. As Furnco makes clear with
its assumption that "we generally assume that [the employer] acts only
with some reason,""3 the Supreme Court views discrimination as a "rea-
son" for acting, meaning a conscious, intentional motivation. Addi-
tionally, circumstantial evidence of discrimination typically involves
the elimination of nondiscriminatory reasons for the action. What-
ever form it takes, the circumstantial evidence is deemed to give rise
to an inference of conscious discrimination.
But, as Charles Lawrence and Linda Krieger have persuasively ar-
gued, a great deal of discrimination is unconscious: the decision-
maker may not be aware that he is discriminating on the basis of race
or sex.64 Unconscious discrimination often takes the form of "cogni-
tive bias," a set of thought processes in which people use unconscious
stereotypes to perceive, organize, and recall information. 6 Such bi-
ases can lead to discriminatory personnel decisions even where the
decisionmaker has no conscious animosity toward women or racial
Corp". v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242, 250 (1988); see also Krieger, supra
note 60, at 1172 ("[A] careful reading of Price Waterhouse reveals that there, as in pre-
text cases, the concepts of motive, intent, and causation are confounded and liability is
premised on the presence of conscious discriminatory animus.").
63 438 U.S. at 577.
64 See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (arguing that in order to re-
move effectively racial prejudice from governmental decisionmaking, legal theorists
must consider unconscious motivation); Krieger, supra note 60, at 1186-1217 (arguing
that current Title VII doctrine is sufficient to address deliberate discrimination, but is
not adequate for dealing with more subtle, unconscious forms of discrimination); see
also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
902, 970-71 (1993) (advocating a negligence standard for liability for unconscious dis-
crimination in employment decisions).
65 Krieger, supra note 60, at 1188.
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minorities, and no consciousness of race or sex as a "factor" in the de-
cision.
3. Causation and Intent in Sexual Harassment Cases
Although sexual harassment is often accompanied by a discrimi-
natory discharge from employment, the textual hook for the sexual
harassment cause of action under Title VII is the phrase "or other-
wise... discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 66 The Su-
preme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 7 established that sexual
harassment creating a hostile environment "[w]ithout question" dis-
criminates with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges,, 68 a phrase
that the court construed as designed "'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment."6' In this
sense, sexual harassment is discrimination because the victim's condi-
tions of employment are significantly worse than are those of her co-
workers simply because of her "sex." Notwithstanding the separate
listing of "fail[ure] or refus[al] to hire or discharge," the subsequent
phrase, "or otherwise to discriminate," indicates that the former are
simply examples of a larger, unified concept of employment discrimi-
nation.7°
Yet in an important sense, harassment (whether based on sex or
race) differs from other kinds of employment actions in a way that
bears directly on the causation inquiry. As previously noted, the func-
tion of the causation/intent inquiry is to determine whether conduct
comes within the purview of Title VII. It thereby fulfills a gatekeeping
function that separates the subset of unlawful discriminatory person-
nel decisions from the mine run of lawful ones. Employers have to
make numerous personnel decisions in order to carry out their busi-
nesses; courts, based on an implicit rule of deference to business
judgment, tend to presume that lawful personnel decisions are effi-
cient or profit maximizing. Therefore, a case alleging discrimination
based on a personnel decision (such as a discharge or a promotion)
challenges activity that the court would presume to be socially produc-
66 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1)
(1994).
67 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
6 Id. at 64.
69 Id. (quoting City of L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
70 Title VII § 703(k) (1) (A) (i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (emphasis added).
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tive if done in a nondiscriminatory way. Harassing conduct, however,
is nonproductive behavior. The kind of conduct directed toward Lois
Robinson, H. Doe, or Joseph Oncale does not typically advance the
employer's interest in the accomplishment of assigned work, and con-
sequently, there will not be a legitimate business rationale for the dis-.• 71
crimination. Insofar as the employer's business judgment is not im-
plicated in harassment cases-in contrast to cases involving arguably
rational personnel decisions-the need for a causation analysis to ful-
fill the gatekeeping function is considerably less.
At the same time, the traditional mode of analyzing causation in
intentional discrimination cases-whether race or sex motivated the
employment decision-does not quite fit harassment cases. In typical
harassment cases, there is no "decision" in the sense of a rational em-
ployment action intended to advance the employer's business. As
discussed above, there is some likelihood that unconscious bias will
inform reasoned decisions. It is even more likely that nonrational,
harassing actions will reflect such unconscious bias, since there is no
call to engage in a conscious process of reasoned decisionmaking in
order to harass. Accordingly, many, perhaps most, harassers may well
act out of intentional but unconscious bias based on a lack of self-
awareness or reflection. In other words, a harasser may not act with
specific intent to keep women out of the workplace, but may engage
in intentional conduct that has that effect, albeit motivated (on a level
closer to consciousness) by sexual interest, misogyny, personal ven-
detta, misguided humor, or boredom, to paraphrase the court in
Doe.73
Perhaps for these reasons, sexual harassment cases have
developed with less attention to the intent of the discrimination.
While some early cases looked for evidence that the harasser targeted
the plaintiff consciously because of her sex, the general trend, at least
in opposite-sex cases, was to put the issue in the background, thereby
71 See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("An employer could never have a legitimate reason for creating a hostile
work environment.").
72 It is, of course, possible in particular circumstances that sex- or race-based har-
assment could be a rational means of furthering a policy of discouraging the advance-
ment of women or minorities. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757
(1998) (describing an instance where an "employer has. a policy of discouraging
women from seeking advancement and 'sexual harassment was simply a way of further-
ing that policy"' (quoting Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052,
1075 (M.D. Ala. 1990))).
73 Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 578 (7th Cir. 1997).
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moving away from a conscious discrimination theory in the sexual
harassment context.7 4 Whereas the sexual desire theory of causation is
very much about circumstantial evidence of a conscious targeting
"because of sex," the sex per se rule is less clear about its
causation/intention theory. Arguably, this feature of the sex per se
rule could be a result of the acceptance by courts of a watered-down
71
MacKinnonism: male sexual conduct in itself subordinates women.
Alternatively, some courts may have implicitly adopted a disparate
impact theory-sexual conduct in the workplace disproportionately
harms women.76 The sex per se rule could also have grown out of a
recognition of the historical role sexual harassment has played in the
workplace. 7  Or, a sex per se rule could even be based on a tort
notion of general, rather than specific, intent: a defendant is liable
for intentional conduct irrespective of whether he intends it to have
particular-in this context, sexist-consequences.
7 8  These theories
are all related in that each rejects an intent-based inquiry.
C. The Emergence of a Sex Per Se Rule
The earliest precedents recognizing a Title VII cause of action for
sexual harassment relied on a sexual-desire-based notion of causation.
In both quid pro quo and hostile environment cases, harassing sexual
conduct was "because of sex" because it was seen as motivated by the
heterosexual impulses of the male harasser. The plaintiff's 'job was
conditioned upon submission to sexual relations-an exaction which
the supervisor would not have sought from any male,"
9 and the har
assment therefore would not have been directed at the plaintiff "but
for her gender."8. Under this sexual-desire-based understanding of
74 See infra Part I.C (discussing the difference between conscious and unconscious
intent in discriminatory acts).
75 See infra Part IL.B (describing courts' treatment of the sex per se rule).
76 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (holding sexual conduct in the workplace to be discriminatory because it "is
disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one [i.e.,' the female] sex").
77 See Doe, 119 F.3d at 572 ("[T]he historic imbalance of power between men and
women in the workplace offers a very compelling reason why the sexual harassment of
a woman by a male superior or co-worker should be understood as sex discrimina-
tion.").
78 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "Title
VII is not a fault-based tort scheme" and is therefore not "'aimed at the ... motiva-
tion"' of harassers (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971))).
79 Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
80 Id. at 989 n.49. The reasoning in Barnes, a quid pro quo case, was extended to
"hostile environment" cases in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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causation, the causal mechanism bringing harassment within the pro-
hibition of Title VII is the heterosexual feelings of attraction, lust, or
desire that motivate the male harasser to act upon a female employee.
Discrimination in the sense of exercising a preference-here a sexual
preference for women rather than men as sex objects-becomes sex
discrimination in the invidious sense because the targeted woman is
disadvantaged relative to her male co-workers. So argued Catharine
MacKinnon in her pathbreaking Sexual Harassment of Working Women.
Despite, or perhaps because of, its simplicity, this sexual-desire-based
understanding of causation in sexual harassment cases dominated
early judicial thinking and continues to be a prevailing component of
sexual harassment doctrine."2
This desire-based "but for" causation theory, however, has serious
shortcomings. First, it places too much emphasis on the subjective
motivation and sexual behavior of the harasser. Factual inquiry into
the harasser's actual motivation could mean an intrusion into his in-
ner mind: such an inquiry would likely be murky, unduly psychologi-
cal, and traumatic for everyone involved-not just the alleged har-
asser, but also the other participants in the litigation who would
undergo the ordeal of learning more than they would want to know
about the harasser's psyche. Alternatively, or in addition, this inquiry
could center on the harasser's sexual conduct outside the workplace.
In order to prove that the harasser's "motive" or "intent" is sexual de-
sire for the plaintiff, the plaintiff might be entitled fairly to open dis-
covery into the harasser's sex life to identify how, and toward whom,
813he makes sexual overtures. Yet, in the end, the complexities of sexu-
ality might render this unseemly and difficult inquiry indeterminate.
Second, the desire-based causation theory could, if rigorously ap-
plied, exclude from Title VII coverage a great deal of harassing con-
duct that suppresses women's employment opportunities even though
Barnes and Jackson are widely regarded as the leading cases launching the sexual har-
assment cause of action. See Franke, supra note 13, at 707-11 (discussing Barnes as the
first decision to recognize employment benefits in exchange for sexual services as sex
discrimination); Schultz, supranote 13, at 1703 (noting that the Barnes court was the
first to adopt the reasoning that "sexual advances were the core of sexual harassment,
that such advances were driven by sexual motivations, and that such motivations sup-
plied an inference of gender discrimination").
81 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 198-200.
82 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998) (using
the sexual-desire-based theory); Franke, supra note 13, at 707-14 (describing how the
courts were slow in accepting the hostile environment theory of sexual harassment).
83 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (providing that evidence of "other... acts" is admissi-
ble to show motive or intent).
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it is not motivated by sexual desire. It has long been broadly acknowl-
edged "that men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace
primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire."84 Psycho-
logical studies, for example, have correlated workplace sexual harass-
ment with strong beliefs in sex-role stereotypes.8 In cases like Harris
86 8v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., in
which the plaintiffs were subjected to offensive physical touching and
sexual innuendoes, the harassers' motivation was to humiliate a
woman co-worker; there was no contention in either case that the
harassing co-workers were interested in sexual relations with the plain-
tiffs.88 A great deal of what has come to be considered garden-variety
sexual harassment could potentially be left without a remedy under a
strictly desire-based theory of causation. 9
Without a great deal of candid discussion of the subject, legal doc-
trine developed a sex per se rule that resolved this problem. In 1980,
the EEOC issued guidelines on "Sexual Harassment" as part of its
general Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.9° According to the
EEOC:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implic-
itly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work-
ing environment.91
84 Franke, supra note 13, at 743.
85 Id. at 742-43 (citing John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual
Harassment: The Person/Situation Interaction, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68, 75-76
(1993)).
86 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
87 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
88 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19-20;Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1498-99.
89 See, e.g., L. Camille Htbert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment
Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 843-44 (1997) ("[E]ven sexual advances often appear to
be motivated by ... hostility toward women."). To be sure, many cases falling outside a
sexual-desire-based theory of causation could be shown to be because of sex under a
comparative evidence approach-proof that men were not similarly subjected to the
offending sexual conduct-even without a sex per se rule. Infra Part 11.B.1.
90 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (2001).
91 Id. § 1604.11(a) (footnote omitted).
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The provisos numbered one through three are meant to adopt
the "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" theories posited by
feminist theorists and that were beginning to emerge in the caselaw.
9 2
They do not explain why "conduct of a sexual nature" is "because of
sex," even though early leading cases recognized causation as one of
the elements of a prima facie claim of sexual harassment.93  In the
EEOC Guidelines, sexual conduct appears to be "because of sex" per
94
se.
Federal courts gradually created a "sex per se" rule of causation by
treating conduct that fell within the second sentence of the EEOC
Guidelines as harassment because of sex without requiring further
96proof.9 In Henson v. City of Dundee, an early leading case, the court
rejected the idea of adopting the McDonnell Douglas "circumstantial
evidence" framework used in typical disparate treatment cases. 7  In
contrast to the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination in
such cases,
the case of sexual harassment that creates an offensive environment does
not present a factual question of intentional discrimination which is at
all elusive. Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervi-
sor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based
92 See MAcKINNON, supra note 21, at 32-47 (exploring these two theories). MacK-
innon used the term "condition of work" harassment to refer to what became known as
the "hostile environment" theory. Id. at 40.
93 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982) (discussing
the EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment and expanding upon the elements of such
a claim to include causation); Franke, supra note 13, at 719 (explaining the elements
of a sexual harassment case as set out in Henson).
94 See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of
Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 14-15 & n.61 (1992) (concluding that
EEOC Guidelines hold that sexual conduct is because of sex irrespective of whether
the harasser was motivated by the victim's sex).
95 See Franke, supra note 13, at 718 ("[I]n cases where the plaintiff alleges hostile
conduct of a sexual nature, most courts ... are willing to infer, if not conclude, that
the conduct was based upon sex .... ); see also, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511
(9th Cir. 1994) (explicitly rejecting the "because of sex" element of the Henson test);
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (omitting "because of sex" as a separate
element of proof).
96 682 F.2d at 897.
97 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (198 1); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,804-05 (1973). Together, McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine established a framework by which a plaintiff could prove, through circumstan-
tial evidence, that a facially neutral employment decision was in fact taken because of
an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or some other comparable charac-
teristic.
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upon sex. We therefore see no reason to suggest a specific prima facie
case for the hostile environment claim.9 8
While Henson's reference to a "bisexual supervisor" suggests the de-
sire-based notion that the slant of the harasser's sexual orientation is
determinative of causation, the case nevertheless represented a major
step in the direction of a sex per se rule by implying that any sexual
conduct-whether or not the conduct could be seen as a sexual "ad-
vance" or "overture"-would suffice.
When the U.S. Supreme Court first took up the issue of sexual
harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,99 the Court took a similar
step in the direction of a sex per se rule. Because Meritor involved
harassment arising out of a sexual relationship gone bad, the desire-
based motivation of the harasser was implicit. Nevertheless, the focus
of the Court's holding was its validation of the "hostile environment"
theory of harassment. In contrast to quid pro quo cases, which by
definition involve sexual advances, hostile environment encompasses
cases such as Jacksonville Shipyards and Harris, where allegations of de-
sire-based conduct are absent. In that context, the Meritor Court's
broad conclusion that " [w] ithout question, when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervi-
sor 'discriminate [s]' on the basis of sex"' 00 could well be seen by lower
courts as a suggestion that they might take the causation element for
granted and focus their attention on the other elements of the har-
assment claim. Moreover, the Meritor Court broadly endorsed the
EEOC Guidelines, which the Court understood in sex per se terms:
where sufficiently severe to create a hostile or abusive working envi-
ronment, "such sexual misconduct" (the Court's summary of the
EEOC's phrase "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature") violates
Title VII.O
A subsequent phase in the development of the sex per se rule was
a tendency of courts to be silent on the causation issue in cases where
the facts did not suggest a desire-based narrative, and where the plain-
tiff made no such allegation. In Harris, the Supreme Court was con-
sidering what factors made an environment hostile, rather than what
made harassing conduct "because of sex." Yet the Court's silence on
98 Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.il.
9q 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
100 Id. at 64.
101 Id. at 65 (quoting EEOC Guidelines found in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2001)).
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that issue in a case involving no allegation of sexual desire by the har-
asser, again, is suggestive for the lower courts: it would have been odd
for the Court to uphold a sexual harassment claim if an essential ele-
ment were missing. 1
2
Eventually, a number of courts became more or less explicit in
stating that sexual conduct is per se because of sex. For example, the
Third Circuit stated that
[t] he intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual
propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual [sic] deroga-
tory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of
course. A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary where the actions
are not sexual by their very nature.103
Or, as the Ninth Circuit has put it most plainly, "sexual harassment is
ordinarily based on sex. What else could it be based on?"'0 4
The sex per se rule emerged in sexual harassment doctrine with-
out any discernable effort by courts to explain its rationale or theo-
retical basis. But it would be a mistake to write off the sex per se rule
as sloppy thinking orjudicial "laziness."'05 The rule seems to be an ad-
vance over a sexual-desire-based "but for" causation theory. There is a
connection between the sex per se rule and the conclusion, stated by
102 To be sure, in Harris, the harasser rounded out his offensive comments with
sex-specific derogatory language (such as the notorious "dumb ass woman" statement),
and the facts further suggested that the plaintiff was treated differently from her male
colleagues, a point emphasized injustice Ginsburg's concurrence. See Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The critical issue... is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." (citation omitted)).
Also, the causation issue was not raised by the defendant. For these reasons, I view
Harris as a step toward a sex per se rule, rather than an endorsement of it.
103 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing cases applying such
an analysis); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 805-06 n.2 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding that comments by co-workers regarding plaintiffs "proclivity to engage
in sexual activity" constituted "harassment that was unquestionably based on gender");
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
("[S]exual behavior directed at women will raise the inference that the harassment is
based on their sex.").
104 Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994). Some courts expressly de-
clined to adopt a sex per se rule. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998,
1010 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[A]lthough the explicitly sexual or vulgar nature of the harass-
ment complained of 'may often take a factfinder a long way toward concluding that
harassing comments were in fact based on gender,' the inference is not inevitable."
(quotingjohnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408,412 (7th Cir. 1997))).
105 See Franke, supra note 13, at 694 (characterizing the judiciary's reliance on the
sex per se rule as 'jurisprudential laziness").
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many courts, that the specific motivation of a sexual harasser should
not matter.16 The worst that can be said is that the courts failed to ar-
ticulate a theoretical rationale for an important-and surely correct-
insight.
D. Doe v. City of Belleville
In Oncale, the Supreme Court identifies Doe v. City of Belleville as
the leading example of cases that "suggest that workplace harassment
that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the har-
asser's sex, sexual orientation, or motivations."07 With its issuance of
Oncale, the Court vacated and remanded Doe for reconsideration in
light of Oncale. This is unfortunate because, in my view, Doe is the
most sophisticated and well-reasoned sexual harassment decision to
date. Although it discusses a "sex per se" rule, it is not properly re-
ducible to a sex per se holding, since the decision in some ways goes
beyond that and in some ways stops short of that. It deserves separate
consideration not only because of its analytical merits and its perti-
nent discussion of sex per se, but also because the Supreme Court
used Doe as a vehicle for its arguable rejection of a sex per se rule.
Doe was a sexual harassment claim brought by twin brothers
(called 'J. Doe" and "H. Doe" in the opinion) who had been hired at
age sixteen to cut weeds and grass at the municipal cemetery. "From
the first, both young men were subjected to a relentless campaign of
harassment by their male co-workers." | °9 H., who wore an earring, was
targeted by one Jeff Dawe, "a former marine of imposing stature," who
constantly referred to H. as "'queer,' "'fag' and his "'bitch.
' ' ° With
the encouragement of other co-workers, Dawe quickly escalated the
harassment to constant musings and threats of taking H. "'out to the
woods"' to rape him."' The verbal taunting turned physical when
Dawe said to H., "'I'm going to finally find out if you are a girl or a
guy,"' and then grabbed.his testicles.'" 2 At that point, H. Doe believed
that Dawe was actually willing to sexually assault him, and the brothers
106 See Doe, 119 F.3d at 578 ("Regardless of why the harasser has targeted the
woman, her gender has become inextricably intertwined with the harassment.").
107 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (citing Doe,
119 F.3d 563).
108 City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
10 Doe, 119 F.3d at 566.
"1o Id. at 567.
"'I Id.
112 Id.
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quit theirjobs shortly after that incident.
1 1 3
The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the harassment was not "because of sex," but the
court of appeals reversed. 14 The appellate court's most prominent
line of reasoning, though, was not a sex per se theory, but rather a sex-
stereotyping theory:
If H. were a woman, no court would have any difficulty construing such
abusive conduct as sexual harassment. And if the harassment were trig-
gered by that woman's decision to wear overalls and a flannel shirt to
work, for example-something her harassers might perceive to be mas-
culine just as they apparently perceived H.'s decision to wear an earring
to be feminine-the court would have all the confirmation that it
needed that the harassment indeed amounted to discrimination on the
basis of sex. The fact that H. is male changes the analysis not at
all ....115
The harassers discriminated against H. Doe "because of sex" by target-
ing him for his failure to conform to stereotypical gender roles associ-
ated with his biological sex.
Doe's sex-stereotyping theory relies, of course, on Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,16 the case in which the Supreme Court has given its clear-
est statement of the idea that an employer's imposition of sex stereo-
types violates Title VII. There, plaintiff Ann Hopkins was rejected in
her bid for partnership by the accounting firm she worked for on the
grounds that her demeanor and appearance were insufficiently femi-
117nine. The Court reasoned that the employer's apparent require-
ment that women conform their behavior to traditional sex-role ex-
pectations-that an employee's gender-role behavior match her sex-
was discrimination because of sex:
[W] e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against indi-
viduals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
113 Id.
114 Id. at 568.
115 Id. (citation omitted).
116 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
117 The evidence of discrimination included statements by decisionmakers that she
was too "macho" and aggressive, that she should take "a course at charm school," and
that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up [and] have her hair styled." Id. at 235. A four-Justice plurality joined by
Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion agreed that this "sex stereotyping" was di-
rect evidence of discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 250-51.
WHEN IS SEX BECA USE OF SEX?
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes."'l8
It is a short analytical step from Price Waterhouse to a sexual har-
assment case based on a sex-gender "mismatch." If, rather than deny
Ann Hopkins a promotion, her partners had instead subjected her to
a stream of verbal and physical abuse to demonstrate their disapproval
of her insufficient "femininity," the same reasoning would plainly con-
trol: harassment would be nothing more than another form of "dis-
parate treatment... resulting from sex stereotypes."'1 9 By the same
token, it takes only a second very short step to conclude that Price Wa-
terhouse should control a case of same-sex harassment, where a male
employee is harassed because his co-workers perceive him as insuffi-
ciently masculine. That is, abusive conduct directed at an employee
because of his or her failure to conform to traditional gender norms is
harassment because of sex.
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Doe court simply could have con-
cluded that but for the sex of the plaintiff, his gender behavior would
not have triggered the harassment. However, the court went on to
consider what type of proof is needed to show "because of sex" in
same-sex harassment cases. While the court acknowledged that a sex-
ual-desire-based theory of causation could be accepted, it is not an ex-
clusive means of proof: "We have never made the viability of sexual
harassment claims dependent upon the sexual orientation of the har-
asser, and we are convinced that it would be both unwise and im-
proper to begin doing so." 120 Nor did the court believe it was neces-
sary for a plaintiff to show differential treatment: "[W]e must
question whether it is appropriate to view sexual harassment as ac-
tionable sex discrimination only when the plaintiff is able to show that
she was harassed because she was a woman rather than a man, or vice
,,121
versa.
The court came close to adopting a sex per se theory in a manner
more explicit than any court had previously done. The court stated
that " [i] t is not clear why such proof [of differential treatment of men
and women] is needed when the harassment has explicit sexual over-
tones,"12 and expressed "considerable skepticism ... [toward] the no-
118 Id. at 251 (quoting City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
119 Id.
120 Doe, 119 F.3d at 575.
121 Id. at 577.
122 Id. at 576.
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tion that same-sex harassment that is overtly sexual and sex-based is
only sex discrimination when the plaintiff can produce proof that the
harasser chose him specifically because he is male., 123 At the end of
the day, however, Doe "[a] ssum [es] arguendo that proof other than the
explicit sexual character of the harassment is indeed necessary"124 and
relies on the extensive record of explicit comments showing that H.
Doe "did not conform to his co-workers' view of appropriate mascu-
line behavior."1 25 In sum, although providing some argument in sup-
port of a sex per se theory, Doe ultimately relies on a sex-stereotyping
theory, where gender-specific language provides the evidence of cau-
sation.
II. ONCALE AND THE SEX PER SE RULE IN THE COURTS
One would think that an opinion as short as Oncale--four pages in
the Supreme Court Reporter-and unanimous at that, would have to be
clear and simple. However, it is far from either. In the words of Kath-
ryn Abrams, writing shortly after the decision was announced, "Oncale
is in many respects an enigma.' 26 At first blush, the Supreme Court's
decision in Oncale seemed like a victory for those who would extend
Title VII to protect against discrimination on account of gender non-
conformity. After all, the plaintiff won; same-sex sexual harassment
was recognized as actionable under Title VII. The Court reached the
result urged (in amicus briefs) by leading feminist scholars who un-
derstood Oncale as a case of a man harassed by heterosexual co-
workers who were questioning the plaintiff's masculinity.1
21
123 Id. at 580.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and
Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1258 (1998). Even the pronunciation of the plain-
tiff s name is difficult to discern. This was a problem for me, anyway, as a latecomer to
the case, having missed Nina Totenberg's report on National Public Radio and en-
countered the opinion primarily through print media and in conversations with peo-
ple who, on this point, were no better informed than I. After hearing and trying sev-
eral pronunciations, I finally called Joseph Oncale's lawyer, Nicholas Canaday, and got
the correct pronunciation: "On" as in "on-off," and "cal" as in "California." The first
syllable is stressed. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Canaday, III, counsel forJoseph
Oncale, Canaday Law Firm (June 15, 2000).
127 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17-20,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568) [hereinaf-
ter Franke & Hunter Brief] (arguing that Oncale was targeted for harassment because
he was "Perceived To Be Insufficiently Masculine"); Brief of National Organization on
Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10,
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On further reflection, Oncale is a highly problematic case that pre-
sents a very mixed result. Like the second generation feminist theo-
rists, the Court apparently felt impelled to respond to the pressure of
the growing number of male-on-male harassment claims, and the
lower courts' confused treatment of them, by reexamining the ques-
tion of what it means to be harassed "because of sex." It is probably
no surprise, however, that the Court did not approach the same-sex
harassment issue with an antisubordination agenda. As I will argue,
the Court's agenda was far different: attempting to resolve the same-
sex issue in a manner consistent with formal equality principles while
at the same time trying to avoid extending Title VII protection to
gender nonconformists. Thus, while the Court, like the second gen-
eration feminist theorists, found it appropriate to question the sex per
se rule, it seems to have done so for very different reasons. Post-Oncale
doctrine gives cause for concern not only about marginalized claim-
ants like H. Doe, but also about plaintiffs such as Lois Robinson in
core sexual harassment cases like Jacksonville Shipyards, who have bene-
fited from the sex per se rule.
A. Oncale, Take One
1. The Holding
Joseph Oncale worked for Sundowner Offshore Services on one of
its offshore oil rigs. In this rough, all-male work environment, Oncale
was subjected to violent sexual hazing by his male co-workers. In a
factual summary omitting the "precise details" to serve "the interest of
both brevity and dignity,' 2 the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion
in Oncale tells us that " [o] n several occasions, Oncale was forcibly sub-
jected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by Lyons, Pip-
pen, and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew. Pippen and
Lyons also physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons
threatened him with rape." 29 After his complaints to his supervisors
proved unavailing, Oncale quit. After some discovery was taken, the
district court granted summary judgment against his case,130 and the
Oncale (No. 96-568) [hereinafter MacKinnon Brief] ("Often it is men perceived not to
conform to stereotyped gender roles who are the targets of male sexual aggression.").
128 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76-77.
129 Id. at 76-77. It is not clear exactly whose dignity is being safeguarded by the
bowdlerized fact summary. Infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
"Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., No. 94-1483, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4119,
at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 1995).
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court of appeals affirmed.' Both courts held as a categorical rule
that Title VII affords no cause of action to a male employee harassed
by male co-workers."'
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[w]e see no justifica-
tion in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title
VII.",' 3 The conclusion stands to reason: the prohibition against sex
discrimination in Title VII had long been held to "protect[] men as
well as women, and the Court had long refused "to presume as a
matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not dis-
criminate against other members of their group."135 Title VII's prohi-
bition, therefore, must "extend to sexual harassment of any kind"-
male/female or same-sex-"that meets the statutory requirements."
3 6
The "statutory requirements," of course, include those articulated
in Meritor and Harris13 that the harassing conduct be "severe or perva-
sive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment.', 3 8  But the requirement of particular concern to the Oncale
court was that the harassment be "because of... sex."
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the work-
place; it is directed only at "discrimination ... because of... sex." ...
"The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed."
139
The Court went on to explain that factfinders have found it "easy"
to infer that "most male-female sexual harassment situations" are sex-
based ("because of sex"), "because the challenged conduct typically
involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity" that probably
"would not have been made to someone of the same sex." 40  This
"easy" inference is not available in the same-sex case, however, and the
131 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
132 Oncale, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4119, at *4-5; Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120.
133 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
134 Id. at 78 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 682 (1983)).
:35 Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
136 Id. at 80.
137 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
138 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
19 Id. at 80 (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a) (1) (altera-
tions in original) and Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg,J., concurring)).
140 Id.
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Court offers three "evidentiary route[s]. '" 4' for a same-sex plaintiff like
Oncale to prove that his harassment was because of sex.
First, "the same chain of inference" the Court deems typical in
male-female cases-implicit or explicit proposals of sexual activity that
would not have been made to someone of the other sex-"would be
available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were
credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual." Second, same-
sex harassment might be proven "for example, if a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman
as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to
the presence of women in the workplace."4 4 Third, a "same-sex har-
assment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evi-
dence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes
in a mixed-sex workplace."'"
The Court reiterates the bottom line: "Whatever evidentiary route
the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the
conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connota-
tions, but actually constituted 'discrimination ... because of... sex.,145
For good measure, Justice Thomas, in a one sentence separate opin-
ion, concurred with the otherwise unanimous decision "because the
Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must
plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there
be discrimination 'because of... sex.""1
46
2. The Opportunities: Marginalized Claimants
and Nonsexual Harassment
Joseph Oncale, the plaintiff, won his case in the Supreme Court,
which reached the result advocated in amicus briefs by feminist theo-
rists-including Franke and MacKinnon-and civil rights groups.147
The initial comments on the case by feminist theorists were at least
guardedly optimistic.14 There are at least two features of the opinion
141 Id. at81.
142 Id. at 80.
143 Id.
'44 Id. at 80-81.
145 Id. at 81 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
146 Id. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
147 Franke & Hunter Brief, supra note 127, at 30; Brief of Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 29, Oncale (No.
96-568) [hereinafter Brief of Lambda LDF]; MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 4-5.
148 Kathryn Abrams, briefly analyzing the decision shortly after its publication,
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for civil rights advocates to celebrate.
First, Oncale can be read as consistent with a theory that sexual
harassment violates Title VII when the harassing conduct is based on
sex stereotyping. 49 The evidence in the case supports a theory that
Oncale was harassed because, in the view of his co-workers, he did not
conform to their stereotypical version of maleness. Moreover, the
opinion "contains a remarkable call for contextualization in the as-
sessment of sexual harassment." 50 The Court emphasized "that the
objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all
the circumstances."]"' In a male-male harassment case, it would natu-
rally have been unsuitable to announce a "reasonable woman" stan-
dard, the desirability of which has been the subject of some debate
among feminist commentators. 5 2 But Oncale's formulation arguably
resolves this controversy in the best way feasible: it appears to demand
of the factfinder a particularized exercise in empathy that drops much
of the baggage of stereotypical notions of reasonable manhood or
womanhood. A person in plaintiffs position "considering all the cir-
cumstances" holds the potential for recognizing personhood in all its
variety. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's limited imaginative horizon,
his example comparing a football coach's "smack[] on the buttocks"
administered alternately to a male player on the football field and to a
female secretary at the coach's office, establishes the liberating notion
that the same conduct not abusive in one context may be severely hos-
tile or abusive in another. Abrams may well be correct that Oncale
found Oncale "implausibly promising" in light of the opinion's failure to come to grips
with a coherent theory of sexual harassment. Abrams, supra note 126, at 1258.
i49 But see infra Part II.B.4 (discussing why the Court refused to invoke their sex-
stereotyping approach to sexual harassment in Oncale).
150 Abrams, supra note 126, at 1258.
151 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993)).
152 The debate over the "reasonable woman" standard has spawned extensive
commentary. The primary lines of argument concern whether, on the one hand, a
"reasonable woman" standard is needed to combat male-centered judgments of how
severe the harassing conduct is or, on the other, such a standard is irretrievably "essen-
tialist" and would privilege the perspective of middle- and upper-class white heterosex-
ual women. For a discussion of that debate, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams, The
Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, 1995 DISSENT 48;
Franke, supra note 13, at 747-48. Anita Bernstein has advocated throwing out a rea-
sonableness standard entirely for the sexual harassment prima facie case, and replac-
ing it with a "respectful person" standard that asks whether the harasser behaved re-
spectfully toward the plaintiff rather than whether a "reasonable" plaintiff would have
perceived the harassment as severe. Bernstein, supra note 13, at 449-53.
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"throws the door open to an entirely new-and heretofore almost en-
tirely marginalized-group of claimants";
153 namely, men who have
"been subjected to punishing verbal and physical harassment because
of [their] perceived gender nonconformity."
154
Second, in reviewing the divided views on same-sex harassment in
the lower courts, the Oncale opinion disapproves of those cases that
"suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always
actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or mo-
tivations." 55 The Court asserts, "[w]e have never held that workplace
harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automati-
cally discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
have sexual content or connotations."5
6 Later, the Court flatly states
that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to
support an inference of discrimination."
57 Thus, Oncale can be read
as moving toward adoption of Vicki Schultz's argument in Reconceptu-
alizing Sexual Harassment, that the sexual desire-dominance paradigm
should be replaced by a theory that recognizes claims for nonsexual
but sex-based harassment: nonsexual hazing, shunning, verbal abuse,
denial of peer mentoring and cooperation, and a variety of other non-
sexual but harassing conduct that has suppressed women's opportuni-
ties, particularly in male-dominated job environments.'
5s Indeed, On
cale has been recognized by some lower courts injust this way.159
'53 Abrams, supra note 126, at 1259.
14 Id. at 1259 n.14. For a recent, more jaundiced view of Oncale's implications, see
L. Camille Hbert, Sexual Harassment as Discrimination "Because of... Sex": Have We
Come Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 439, 463-64, 484 (2001).
155 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. The Court cites Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th
Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998), as such a case. As argued below, that char-
acterization of Doe is somewhat misleading.
156 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
157 Id.
158 Oncale was issued as Schultz's article went to press; although she did not have a
full opportunity to consider its implications, she expressed the view that "the result and
reasoning of the case conform to, and in fact provide added support for" her analysis.
Schultz, supra note 13, at 1683 n.t.
159 See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that conduct underlying a sexual harassment claim need not be overtly sexual
in nature); Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 270 (5th Cir. 1998) (analyz-
ing a sexual harassment claim, not in terms of sexual nature of allegedly harassing
conduct, but rather in terms of whether conduct was designed to undermine a
woman's competence); see also O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097
(10th Cir. 1999) (relying on pre-Onca/e authorities for holding that nonsexual and fa-
cially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of gender animus sufficient to sus-
tain a hostile environment claim).
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3. Clouds of Doubt: Joseph Oncale's Fate on Remand
Supreme Court opinions are often unreliable guides to their own
aftermath. Joseph Oncale "won" his case in the Supreme Court, in
that the Fifth Circuit's holding categorically barring same-sex harass-
ment cases was reversed. Other than that, the United States Reports tell
us only that "the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.'" 6° What would those proceedings look like? Would
Oncale be able to prove that his harassment was "discrimination...
because of... sex" under any of the three "evidentiary route[s]" sug-
gested by the Court?""
The answer would seem to be "no." The first route, sexual ad-
vances motivated by the desire of a "homosexual" harasser, would re-
quire Oncale to produce "credible evidence that the harasser was ho-
mosexual."62 Such evidence does not jump out of the opinion; nor
would it seem to fit a theory of the case as a story of sexual violence to
enforce heterosexist gender norms.
The second route-sex-specific derogatory language showing the
harasser's hostility to that sex in the workplace_6 3-matches the facts
even less. It is doubtful that any of Oncale's harassers expressed a
general hostility to men in the workplace. The notion seems far-
fetched in a male-dominated work world, and that may well explain
why the Court illustrated this evidentiary approach with an example of
"a female victim .. . harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory
terms by another woman. ", 64 The story of a woman who breaks into a
male-dominated job and later opposes subsequent women entrants-a
hostility likely born out of the frustration of limited opportunity-is as
familiar as a male version of that story is fanciful. The third route-
"direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes in a mixed sex workplace"165 -also appears un-
available to Oncale. The oil rig was an all-male environment. On
closer examination, then, it would appear that Oncale would have to
settle for the largely symbolic personal satisfaction of winning a rever-
sal in the U.S. Supreme Court since he seemed destined to lose on
remand.
160 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
161 Id. at 81.
162 Id. at 80.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 80-81.
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The reality was more complicated. On remand, Sundowner
moved for summary judgment, making the argument outlined above:
that Oncale could not prove discrimination under any of the three
"evidentiary routes" outlined by the Court. Although Oncale argued
in opposition that the three evidentiary routes were mere examples
that were not intended to be exhaustive of the ways to prove harass-
ment because of sex, he fell back on two of the routes set forth in the
opinion. First, Oncale argued that sexual conduct by a male harasser
directed to a male victim was prima facie evidence of homosexuality-
"a homosexual is as a homosexual does," so to speak-and should be
sufficient evidence to rebut any "presumption of heterosexuality" and
survive summary judgment."6 The employer's evidence, if any, that
the harassers had no sexual desire for Oncale and engaged in hetero-
sexual relations outside of work, would simply raise an issue of fact for
the jury. Second, Oncale argued that there was comparative evidence
in a limited sense: women worked in Sundowner's corporate offices,
and the employer took their complaints of sexual harassment seri-
ously, whereas Oncale's complaints were disregarded."7 Sundowner's
motion for summary judgment was denied, and three days before trial
the case ended in a confidential settlement without further published
decision9'8
One might feel disappointment that Oncale's attorneys really did
not fight to establish new "evidentiary routes" to prove "because of
sex," instead of trying to shoehorn the facts into the routes stated in
the opinion. The comparative evidence argument stretches the facts,
and suggests crabbed possibilities for other plaintiffs. The argument
that the harassers were in fact homosexual leaves a bad impression, as
though Oncale took the low road: there is a gay-bashing quality to a
legal doctrine that seems to call for a "homosexual" villain, and that
story does not really seem to match up with Oncale's experience any-
way. But Oncale and his attorneys can hardly be blamed for trying to
win their case. Courts that have been reversed are rarely in an inno-
vating mood on remand; this district court might well have decided
that the three routes outlined in Oncale were the only three. Given
this state of affairs, Oncale's attorneys made clever arguments that
166 For a post-Oncale decision accepting just this argument to deny summary judg-
ment, see Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078-79 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
167 Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-17 (Oct. 13,
1998), Oncale (No. 94-1483) (on file with author).
168 Telephone Interview with Nicholas Canaday, III, counsel for Joseph Oncale,
Canaday Law Firm (June 15, 2000).
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served their client's interest. The blame must fall squarely on the Su-
preme Court.
B. Oncale, Take Two
Oncale, indeed, is a decision that looks worse and worse on each
successive reading. On further reflection, it may be more accurate to
characterize it as a "reverse discrimination" case than one that extends
Title VII protection to marginalized claimants.
1. Proving "Because of Sex" Without a Sex Per Se Rule
Oncale repeatedly stresses the need to prove causation: the con-
duct, to be actionable sex discrimination, must be because of sex. The
legal analysis section in Oncale is nine paragraphs long; the phrase
"because of... sex" appears six times, perhaps only two or three repe-
titions short of obsessive.O The repetitive attention to this phrase
from Title VII's operative Section 7 03(a) (1) defining the unlawful
employment practice ("discrimination... because of [etc.]") empha-
sizes Justice Scalia's authorship, and in particular his textualist credo
based on the idea that the words of the statute generate determinate
meanings that govern judicial interpretations. 70 Oncale conveys the
impression that this ambiguous phrase will gain a fixed meaning from
its forceful repetition alone. The sex per se rule provided a useful
evidentiary shortcut by which sexual harassment plaintiffs could estab-lish • 171
lish causation. Recognizing these virtues, two of Oncale's support-
ing amici urged the adoption of a rule that, whatever other conduct
might also qualify as harassment because of sex, sexual conduct is per
se because of sex. 72 But the Court demurred, stating that "[w]e have
never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men
and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely be-
169 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-81.
170 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29, 16-35 (1997)(providing a textualist approach to statutory interpretation in which "the objective in-
dication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislator, is what constitutes the
law").
71 Supra Part. I.C.
72 See MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 18 ("Sexuality is gendered in societies
of sex inequality. As a result, for better or worse, in most instances it is the essence of
sexual conduct between two individuals that the one initiating or inviting the conduct
normally does so because of the other's sex." (citations and internal quotations omit-
ted)); Brief of Lambda LDF, supra note 147, at 5-8 (arguing that conduct of a sexual
nature is inherently because of sex).
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cause the words used have sexual content or connotations."
1 3 Instead,
the sexual nature of harassing conduct, Oncale implies, will be relevant
only when based on sexual desire. The Court reasoned that it is "rea-
sonable to assume" that "explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activ-
ity" targeted at a person by the opposite sex by a (presumed) hetero-
sexual or at a person of the same sex by a (proven) homosexual is
because of sex. 74 In cases like Jacksonville Shipyards or Harris, involving
abusive sex-specific language and physical touching but no "proposals
of sexual activity," there will presumably have to be some further
proof that the conduct is "because of sex." What will this proof look
like?
Of two remaining evidentiary routes, one is itself comparative evi-
dence. The other evidentiary route, "sex specific and derogatory re-
marks" showing "general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace," 175 suggests the sort of evidence at work in mixed-motive
cases. Called "direct" evidence in the caselaw, it is actually circum-
stantial evidence into the harasser's discriminatory mind. The Court
does not say these examples were exhaustive, and it would have been
helpful had the opinion reaffirmed more clearly that the critical issue
is discriminatory intent, however proved. Although the Oncale eviden-
tiary routes seemingly should not be viewed as exhaustive, since the
issue is discriminatory intent, lower courts have predictably divided on
the issue to date." 6
The emphasis on comparative evidence becomes problematic
both in single-sex workplaces, such as Oncale's, and cases in which the
employer can claim that the harasser targeted both men and women.
What happens, for example, in a case like Jacksonville Shipyards,
where the work atmosphere is permeated by degrading sexual lan-
guage and images but is not necessarily "targeted" at members of one
sex rather than another? Under a sex per se rule, the causation ele-
ment would have been taken for granted; under Oncale, however, it is
not clear that any of the evidentiary routes would apply.
173 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Compare Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (as-
serting that Oncale's examples of evidence of causation are instructive, not exhaustive),
with Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714-15 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (suggesting
that the three routes are exhaustive).
177 Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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2. The Civility Code Problem
Why did the Oncale Court find it necessary to shun the sex per se
rule? The Court stated explicitly its view that proof of causation is
perhaps the key feature that prevents Title VII from becoming "a gen-
eral civility code for the American workplace.' 7 8  Presumably, a sex
per se rule would run the risk of creating such a civility code by mak-
ing a federal case out of even the mildest sexual banter. This is, how-
ever, at best a half-truth.
Given the facts of the case, Oncale was hardly an appropriate vehi-
cle to illustrate the danger of a sex per se rule transforming Title VII
into a civility code. The abuse to which Oncale was subjected, accord-
ing to his testimony, was not mere "incivility.' 77 It was rape.1 80 The
178 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
179 The facts were summarized in the MacKinnon amicus brief as follows:
John Lyons began his sexual advances and sexual objectification of Oncale
early in his employment. Dep. at 40:8-9 ("You know you got a cute little ass,
boy[.]"). Lyons said he was going to "fuck me in my behind." Aff. at 1. He
threatened to rape him. Dep. at 41-42. ("'If I don't get you now, I'll get you
later. I'm going to get you. You're going to give it to me.'... [H]e said that I
would have sex with him before it was over."). Such remarks were constant.
On October 25, 1991, Oncale was first sexually attacked physically. Aff. at 1.
Pippen grabbed him, pulled him down, and held him immobile in a squatting
position on his knees while Lyons unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis,
and stuck it onto the back of Oncale's head. Dep. at 49-52. Oncale asked
them to quit. Dep. at 53:2-3. Lyons and Pippen laughed. Dep. at 53:8-9. On-
cale later that day learned that most of his co-workers had seen the assault.
Dep. at 53:2-3; Aff. at 2.
The next day, Brandon Johnson chose a dangerous moment on the job to
grab Oncale and force him to the ground again. Dep. at 55. Lyons pulled his
penis out and put it on Oncale's arm. Dep. at 57. Oncale complained to su-
periors. Aff. at 1.
That same night, Lyons and Pippen attempted to rape Oncale as he was tak-
ing a shower. Pippen grabbed him, lifting him off the ground by the knees,
while 'John Lyons grabs the bar of soap and rubbed it between the cheeks of
my ass and tells me, you know, they're fixing to fuck me... " Dep. at 58.
Oncale struggled and got away. Dep. at 60. He believed the intentions of Ly-
ons were "to rape me" and those of Pippen were "to assist and/or
help.., rape me, too." Dep. at 72.
Oncale complained further and tried to arrange to get off the oil rig. The
sexual advances and sexual threats continued. John Lyons said: "You told
your daddy, huh? Well, it ain't going to do you no good because I'm going to
fuck you anyway." Dep. at 74. Oncale "felt that if I didn't leave my job, that I
would be raped or forced to have sex .. . that if I didn't get off the rig, that I
would be sexually violated." Dep. at 73.
MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 2-3.
180 The harassment directed at Oncale by his co-workers and supervisors was, in
fact, criminal. Under Louisiana law, Lyons could have been charged with sexual bat-
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notion that a restrictive interpretation of causation is needed to keep
cases like this from turning Title VII into a "civility code" ignores the
other requirements of a sexual harassment claim, namely, that the
conduct must be severe or pervasive. Trivial sexual incivilities were
not considered sexual harassment, even by courts that adhered to a
sex per se rule, because they are not severe or pervasive. Additionally,
as a matter of logic it would seem that the need to screen out mere in-
civility should be handled by the severity requirement rather than the
requirement of intent to discriminate. Thus, the civility code "prob-
lem" that seems to have irritated the Court need not have been solved
by disapproving the sex per se rule.
3. Comparative Evidence and the Equal Opportunity Harasser
A so-called "equal opportunity harasser defense" is based on the
idea that harassment cannot be "because of sex" if the harassing con-
duct is directed at both men and women. Technically, it is not an af-
firmative "defense" that must be pleaded and proved by a defendant,
but rather a name given to a defendant's argument that the plaintiff
has failed to meet her burden of establishing causation. The notion
of such a defense argument was raised by the court in the first opinion
to recognize a sexual harassment claim, Barnes v. Costle,'
s' which noted
that "[i] n the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual
favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would
apply to male and female employees alike.'
82 In Barnes's context of a
quid pro quo claim based on sexual advances, the issue was framed in
terms of a "bisexual harasser," but the notion of an "equal opportu-
nity" harasser has been debated in the caselaw for some time since
Barnes.18 3 Oncale's emphatic repetition of "because of sex," combined
tery, a crime punishable by up to ten years in prison. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43.1 (West
1997) ("Sexual battery is... [t]he touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the
offender using any instrumentality."); see also CONN. STAT. GEN. ANN. § 53a-72a (West
2001) (defining third degree sexual assault as "compel[ing] a person to submit to
sexual contact... by the use of force"); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.415(1) (Supp. 1998)
(declaring that a person commits third degree sexual abuse if he "subjects another
person to sexual contact" and the victim does not consent); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(1)(c) (West 1996) (defining first degree sexual assault as having "sexual
contact [aided by one or more persons] ... with another person without consent of
that person by use or threat of force or violence").
r1 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
182 Id. at 990 n.55.
183 Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[I] nstances of complained of sexual conduct that prove equally offensive to male
and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge because
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with its emphasis on "comparative evidence," suggests that the Su-
preme Court is leaning heavily toward those courts holding that em-
ployers can avoid liability for harassment by pointing to harassment of
members of the opposite sex of the plaintiff.
One such case is Holman v. Indiana,184 in which a married couple
employed by the state alleged that their supervisor sexually harassed
each of them with physical touching and sexual propositions. 185 The
court dismissed these claims at the pleading stage, reasoning that "Ti-
tle VII does not cover the 'equal opportunity' or 'bisexual' harasser,
then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex.
He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treat-
ing both sexes the same (albeit badly)."186 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied heavily on "Oncale's emphasis on the statutory re-
quirement of discrimination,"'87 and in particular on Oncale's heavy
reliance on Justice Ginsburg's dictum that differential treatment of
the sexes is "the critical issue" in sex discrimination cases. The Hol-
man court found it entirely appropriate "for a Title VII remedy to be
precluded when both sexes are treated badly," and expressed concern
only for opportunistic equal opportunity harassers who might try to
"manufacture additional harassments to attempt to avoid Title VII li-
ability"-" [i] n such cases the harasser is not a bona fide 'equal oppor-
tunity' harasser," and might be precluded from the benefit of the so-
called defense.8 9
Significantly, the "equal opportunity harasser defense" has not
been limited to cases where the harasser actually harasses members of
both sexes. Combining the emphasis on comparative evidence with a
recognition that it is ultimately intent that matters, some courts have
dismissed harassment claims based on evidence-sometimes very thin
evidence-that the harasser would hypothetically be inclined to subject
both men and women were accorded like treatment."), with Steiner v. Showboat Oper-
ating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting equal opportunity harasser de-
fense to female plaintiff's claim and holding open "the possibility that both men and
women working at Showboat have viable claims against Trenkle for sexual harass-
ment").
184 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
185 See id. at 401 (detailing plaintiffs' claims).
186 Id. at 403.
187 Id.
188 Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring))).
189 Id. at 404. Need it be observed that the notion of a bona fide (that is, "good
faith") equal opportunity harasser is somewhat ludicrous?
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members of the other sex to similar abuse. In Shepherd v. Slater Steels
Corp.,190 the district court had dismissed a same-sex harassment claim
based on the plaintiffs belief that the harasser had a propensity to
harass both men and women. Although the court of appeals reversed
on the ground that the speculative and hearsay evidence of such
"equal opportunity harassment" was not strong enough to grant sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, the court did adhere to the argu-
ment that equal opportunity harassment escapes Title VII liability. 9
Moreover, this example does bespeak a defense strategy-the hypo-
thetical equal opportunity harasser-that can be successful in some
courts.
192
The lower courts continue to be divided on whether equal oppor-
tunity harassment escapes Title VII liability. In Brown v. Henderson,
9 3
the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff, a female postal
worker, was harassed due to her involvement in a union election
rather than because of her sex, but rejected the idea that equal oppor-
tunity harassment as a matter of law defeats a finding of causation. In
a particularly insightful opinion by Judge Calabresi, the court cited
caselaw holding that discrimination claims focus on whether an indi-
vidual has been mistreated due to her group-based characteristics.
Thus, "discrimination against one employee cannot be cured, or dis-
proven, solely by favorable, or equitable, treatment of other employ-
ees of the same race or sex.' 9 4 From these principles, the court con-
cluded that, although "in the absence of evidence suggesting that a
plaintiffs sex was relevant" similar mistreatment of men and women
may create an inference that sex was not the reason for it, "the inquiry
into whether ill treatment was actually sex-based discrimination
190 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
191 See id. at 1011 ("[W]hat matters is whether Jemison in fact did sexually harass
members of both genders.... [T]he evidence establishes nothing more than the pos-
sibilig ....).
See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Edmondson, J., concurring) (concluding that plaintiffs sexual harassment claim
based on being bumped, leered at, and followed was not because of sex, because such
conduct is commonplace and "can occur whether the employees are men or women");
Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing sexual har-
assment claim of female plaintiff who was verbally abused and "thumped" on the head
by her male supervisor because plaintiff testified at her deposition that she did not be-
lieve that her supervisor was motivated by the fact that she was a woman).
193 257 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
194 Id. at 252.
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cannot be short-circuited by the mere fact that both men and women
are involved.,
19 5
For it may be the case that a co-worker or supervisor treats both men and
women badly, but women worse. Or .... a woman might be abused in
ways that cannot be explained without reference to her sex, notwith-
standing the fact that a man received treatment at least as harsh, though
for other-non-sexual-reasons. Finally, there might even be circum-
stances that are actionable under Title VII when both men and women
suffer sexually discriminatory harms in the same workplace, but for dif-
ferent reasons.196
Despite cases like Brown, Oncale's heavy emphasis on comparative
evidence and differential treatment lends support to the argument
that the "equal opportunity harasser" does not violate Title VII. To
see through the conceptual error of conflating differential treatment
with the intent to discriminate requires a particularly focused and
well-reasoned effort that lower courts may lack the time, energy, and
vision to make.
4. Avoidance of a Sex-Stereotyping/Gender Harassment Theory
The facts of Oncale seem to call out for the invocation of a sex-
stereotyping theory of sexual harassment, relying on Price Waterhouse.
9 7
Such a theory was ably argued to the court in amicus briefs filed in
support of Oncale,'9 8 and a sex-stereotyping theory also was relied
upon in Doe v. City of Belleville, which was likewise under review by the
Supreme Court. The Oncale Court was thus well aware of the doc-
trinal advantages of a sex-stereotyping theory, which would have
solved the two primary problems faced by the Court: how to hold that
same-sex harassment was "because of sex," while clarifying that all
sexual harassment claims must be "because of sex." However, no-
where in Oncale does the Court refer to the harassment as conceivably
falling within the "spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."' 9  Indeed, the word "stereo-
type" does not appear in the opinion. Nor is there a citation to Price
Waterhouse. Also significant is the Oncale Court's backhanded treat-
195 Id. at 254.
196 Id. at 254-55 (citation omitted).
197 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
See supra note 127 (citing the briefs filed in support of petitioner Oncale).
99 L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (cita-
tion and internal quotations omitted), quoted in Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,
581 (1997).
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ment of Doe, which the Court unfairly dismissed in a single sentence as
a case wrongly holding "that workplace harassment that is sexual in
content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual
orientation or motivations."
20 0
In light of all the ways that a sex-stereotyping theory should have
come to the Court's attention, the complete failure of the Oncale opin-
ion to address the sex-stereotyping theory of harassment, along with
its failure to identify sex-stereotyping as an "evidentiary route" for
proving "because of sex," is notable and disturbing. The sex-
stereotyping theory has far-reaching potential for advancing Title VII's
goal of full workplace integration of traditionally excluded groups. As
several feminist theorists have forcefully argued, the enforcement of
hetero-male gender norms in the workplace excludes not only gender-
nonconformists from employment opportunities, but also women
generally. 01 The sex-stereotyping of Ann Hopkins, for example,
blocked her opportunities not simply because she exhibited masculine
traits that the accounting partners found off-putting coming from a
woman, but rather because it placed Hopkins in a "double bind."
2 0 2 As
the Price Waterhouse Court expressly recognized, "[a]n employer who
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this
trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch-22: out
of ajob if they behave aggressively and out of ajob if they do not. Ti-
tle VII lifts women out of this bind."
2 3
5. Homophobia
Why would the Court so blatantly snub the sex-stereotyping theory
when it would serve the purposes at hand in a manner consistent with
both the "because of sex" mandate and the core Title VII purpose of
breaking down employment barriers for women? A number of signs
point to an answer that cuts directly against Oncale's surface appear-
ance of including marginalized claimants. Embracing a sex-
stereotyping theory in a same-sex harassment case would be tanta-
mount to extending Title VII harassment protection to lesbians, gays,
200 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). In a sepa-
rate action, the Court vacated and remanded Doe in light of Oncale. City of Belleville v.
Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
201 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing possible means of identifying sexual harassment
other than sex per se).
2 Case, supra note 27, at 45.
203 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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and •204
and gender nonconformists. Such discrimination is inevitably based
on the perception that the target of the discrimination has failed to
adopt behavior-gender or sexual behavior-deemed suitable to his
or her sex, and is therefore discrimination "because of ... sex" under
a plain language reading of Title VII.10 5 The Court's resounding si-
lence on the sex-stereotyping issue and caselaw suggest that the Court
studiously avoided extending Title VII in this direction. None of the
"evidentiary routes" in Oncale would seem to protect gender noncon-
formists from the most prevalent forms of harassment they face.
There is a further clue to the existence of this disquieting under-
current in Oncale. The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice
Scalia, who has elsewhere emphasized what he views as the impor-
tance of maintaining a strict distinction between sex and gender. Dis-
senting from a 1994 decision holding that sex-based peremptory chal-
lenges to women jurors constituted sex discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Scalia noted:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination
rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination. The word "gen-
der" has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitu-
dinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to
the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and
masculine to male. The present case does not involve peremptory strikes
exercised on the basis of femininity or masculinity (as far as it appears,
effeminate men did not survive the prosecution's peremptories). The
206case involves, therefore, sex discrimination plain and simple.
This may well be more than textual correctness on Justice Scalia's
part. If "sex discrimination plain and simple" is to be understood as
entirely distinct from gender discrimination-discrimination based on
attitudinal characteristics or sex roles-then Justice Scalia has laid the
foundation for an argument that the prohibitions on sex discrimina-
tion found in Title VII and constitutional law do not protect against
this emerging understanding of gender discrimination. Hence, dis-
crimination against lesbians, gays, and gender nonconformists would
207not be prohibited by antidiscrimination law. It should not be sur-
204 Infra Part V.B.2.
205 Case, supra note 27, at 57-75; Flynn, supra note 27, at 396-408; Valdes, supra
note 27, at 192.
206 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
The notion that Title VII's reference to "sex" should mean biological sex, to
the exclusion of gender, is a dubious one as a matter of either statutory text or legisla-
tive intent. Even Justice Scalia would find, referring to the dictionaries "in force" at
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prising, therefore, that in deciding Oncale some of the Justices con-
sciously sought to avoid opening the door to such claimants.
At the same time, Oncale seems to contemplate ways in which sex-
ual harassment doctrine can be turned on lesbians and gays with a
new intensity. Oncale approves a legal (rebuttable) presumption of
heterosexuality (over the strenuous objection of several amici). While
"it is reasonable to assume" that "explicit or implicit proposals of sex-
ual activity" from a male harasser to a female victim "would not have
been made to someone of the same sex," same-sex harassment will
only get that inference "if there [is] credible evidence that the harasser
[is] homosexual." 20 So, whereas heterosexuality is presumed, homo-
sexuality must be proven. Oncale thus invites the federal courts to em-
bark on some potentially very ugly lines of factual inquiry. In a case
like Oncale itself, the plaintiff must attempt to prove that a harasser
who believes, or at least claims, he is heterosexual is "really" a homo-
sexual. This, of course, will require the courts to determine what
makes someone "homosexual," for sexual harassment purposes, a
question that has been recognized as extremely complex by psychol-
ogy experts, sociologists, and philosophers.209 Tests may have to be
the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a blurring of this sex-gender
distinction that he found "new and useful" in JE.B. The second definition of "sex,"
after biological and before sexual, was "the sum of the morphological, physiological,
and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction with
its concomitant genetic segregation and recombination which underlie most evolu-
tionary change." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (un-
abridged ed. 1961) (emphasis added). The same dictionary defines "gender" as "sex."
Id. at 944 (definition lb). Definition two of "gender" refers to the linguistic division
into masculine and feminine subclasses, but the definitions of gender nowhere refer to
masculine and feminine behavior, id. at 944, which Websters instead places within the
definition of "sex," id. at 2081.
208 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
209 The definition of homosexuality may refer to "same-gender behavior, desire,
self-definition, or identification or some combination of these elements .... Develop-
ment of self-identification as homosexual or gay is a psychologically and socially com-
plex state .... EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 290-91 (1994); see also 1 MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Pantheon Books 1978) (1976) ("[T]he psychological, psychiatric, medical category of
homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was characterized... less by a type
of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility .... ); ALFRED C.
KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610-66 (1948) (noting the diffi-
culty of defining homosexuality and then rating and analyzing heterosexuality and
homosexuality on a zero-to-six scale based on frequency of various kinds of sociosexual
experiences); id. at 656 ("[N]early half (46%) of the population engages in both het-
erosexual and homosexual activities... in the course of their adult lives."); Mary
McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOC. PROBS. 182, 184 (1968) ("[S]exual behavior
17452002]
1746 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1697
devised to determine a sufficient degree of "homosexuality" to raise a
presumption that sexual conduct toward the victim was motivated by
"desire" rather than mere "rough-housing" or "horseplay."21 ° At the
same time, recognition of same-sex harassment in conjunction with an
inference of sexual desire flowing from "credible evidence that the
harasser was homosexual"211 may open up opportunities for persecu-
tion of gays and lesbians, taking the form of the harassment claims
themselves, as well as the accompanying intrusive discovery into al-
leged harassers' private lives to "prove" their homosexuality. Such in-
quiries would not be necessary regarding heterosexual harassers,
whose sexual orientation is presumed and need not be supported with
"credible evidence." All the while, participants in this drama will be
scratching their heads trying to figure out why, as MacKinnon puts it,
"Title VII access [will] now turn on the sexual feelings and imagined
or real sexual identities of the perpetrators ... [why] the gender of
those with whom Lyons and Pippen are sexual, when others want to
be sexual with them, determine Oncale's rights against them.,
21
1
A further implication of Oncale may be that while heterosexuals
can abuse same-sex gay/lesbian co-workers with impunity, openly gay
and lesbian employees may be especially vulnerable to harassment
claims. In a particularly troubling passage, the Court describes forms
of "ordinary socializing in the workplace" that do not rise to the level
of discrimination: these include "male-on-male horseplay" and "inter-
sexual flirtation."2 1 3 "Male-on-male horseplay" has a strong heterosex-
ual undertone to it. It brings to mind Scalia's example of the coach
slapping the football player on the buttocks and his caveat that the
harassment "inquiry requires careful consideration of the social con-
text in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its tar-
get. "214 If the football coach is straight, the buttocks slap is mere
"horseplay." If he's gay, then ....
What then for "intersexual flirtation"? Assuming that phrase
215means flirtation between people of the opposite sex, then what are
patterns cannot be dichotomized in the way that the social roles of homosexual and
heterosexual can.").
210 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
211 Id. at 80.
212 MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 25.
213 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
214 Id.
215 The term "intersexual" is frequently used (like hermaphrodite) to refer to
people whose genitalia are ambiguous-not clearly male or female-and whose anat-
omy thereby raises questions about our culture's binary assumption about biological
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we to make of its juxtaposition with "male-on-male [i.e., "intrasexual"]
horseplay"? Oncale suggests that horseplay is mere "ordinary socializ-
ing" between guys, and flirtation is "ordinary socializing" between guys
and gals. 6 So what happens when one guy flirts with another? I fear
that "careful consideration of the social context" will kick in at this
point and prevailing homophobic norms, particularly heterosexual
male hypersensitivity to "intrasexual flirtation," will serve as the "rea-
sonable person standard," ultimately creating an oppressive double
standard. Straight men can flirt with women with some leeway for
unwelcome incivilities; but gay men who flirt with men are sexual har-
assers. "The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires
neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace," the Oncale Court
opines,2 7 but it seems to tilt heavily in favor of heterosexuality.
6. Oncale as a Reverse Discrimination Case
In the end, Oncale may be most accurately understood as a reverse
discrimination case. Who are the winners in Oncale? Women, the
core constituency of Title VII's protection against sexual harassment,
gain some and lose some. They gain increased access to the courts
with claims of nonsexual harassment, but lose the because-of-sex pre-
sumption for claims involving harassing sexual conduct that do not
involve "proposals of sexual activity" motivated by sexual desire. Les-
bians, gays, and gender nonconformists lose much and win little. Ar-
guably, heterosexual males represent the only group that gains some-
thing and loses nothing. They gain clear entree as sexual harassment
plaintiffs, contrary to the categorical rule of the Fifth Circuit.218 While
same-sex claims are recognized, Oncale tells us that credible evidence
of homosexuality will raise an inference that a "sexual advance" is be-
cause of sex. This standard clearly recognizes same-sex claims against
gay men, but not necessarily against straight men. As in Oncale on
remand, a plaintiff might have to cast his harasser in the ill-fitting role
of gay villain to win the case. Meanwhile, heterosexuals gain, perhaps,
an argument that "intrasexual flirtation" is actionable at a lower
threshold than "intersexual flirtation," insofar as the "reasonable" vic-
sex. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between
Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 265, 285 (1999). I would bet large sums of money
thatJustice Scalia did not intend to refer to these folks.
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 77-78 (citing Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir.
1994)).
17472002]
1748 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1697
tim standard deems gay sexual advances more offensive than straight
ones.
As the analysis is framed, Oncale accepts the same-sex harassment
claim not by recognizing an antisubordination argument that the
plaintiffs harassment was part and parcel of an assertion of hetero-
male workplace primacy. Rather, the Court was simply pursuing the
same formal equality logic that has led to the acceptance of reverse
discrimination claims under Title VII: the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination protects men as well as women who can prove that they
were treated differently because of their sex.
III. THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST A SEX PER SE RULE
The second generation sexual harassment scholarship has been
aimed at moving sexual harassment doctrine forward through a vari-
ety of cross-currents and pressures that developed since the Supreme
Court recognized the cause of action in 1986." 9 First, according to
the research of Vicki Schultz, the sexual-desire based theory of sexual
harassment, which dominated early cases and lingered as the law de-
veloped, caused courts to tend to ignore pervasive but nonsexual har-
assing conduct against women.2 ° Second, a popular backlash against
some of the baggage associated with MacKinnon and other early
feminist sexual harassment theorists emerged as a potential threat to
the sustainability of robust enforcement of Title VII's sexual harass-
ment prohibition.2 l Finally, an increasing number of same-sex (pre-
dominantly, male-on-male) harassment cases were surfacing in the
lower courts, exposing both the problem of workplace harassment of
gender nonconformists and the shortcomings of courts' theoretical
understanding of the nature of sexual harassment as a Title VII viola-
222tion. The work of Schultz, Franke, and Abrams, either recently pub-
lished or in final editorial stages just before the Oncale decision was
announced at the end of 'the 1997-1998 Supreme Court Term, are
prominent examples of theoretical efforts to deal with these issues. A
theme running through all three works is the effort to broaden the
understanding of sexual harassment, either to include nonsexual
forms of harassment or cases of male-on-male harassment targeting
219 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (recognizing a cause of
action for sexual harassment).
220 Infra Part III.A.1.
221 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1793-94.
See Franke, supra note 13, at 696-98 (citing cases).
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men who fail to conform to traditional masculine gender roles; while
at the same time promoting women's sexual agency by rejecting the
stereotypical notion that male sexual conduct automatically victimizes
women. In this Section, I examine the work of each of these theorists
to show how each either expressly rejects the sex per se rule (in the
cases of Schultz and Franke) or implicitly abandons it (Abrams),
based on the perceived need to address these issues. However, as I go
on to argue, the sex per se rule is not part of the problem and its re-
jection is not necessary to the solution.
A. Sexual Harassment Reconceptualized
1. Desexualizing Sexual Harassment
Vicki Schultz has argued for many years that "overtly sexual behav-
ior" is "only the tip of a tremendous iceberg" of harassment of work-
223ing women through nonsexual behavior. . In Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment,2 4 Schultz argues that the bulk of that iceberg has been
submerged because a "sexual desire-dominance paradigm governs"
the law of sexual harassment. 225 According to then-current legal doc-
trine (pre-Oncale, when Schultz wrote her article), sexually harassing
conduct was understood to consist of unwanted heterosexual ad-
vances. Such conduct was recognized as a violation of Tide VII be-
cause it came to be seen as motivated either by sexual desire or an in-
tent to exploit women sexually: "Either way, [the harasser's] actions
are an abuse of his power and an abuse of her sex," and therefore
properly understood as discrimination because of sex.226 The doctrine
grew out of the radical feminist argument that "sexual desire and
domination were inextricably linked in the institution of heterosexual-
ity."22 7 According to Schultz, the sexual desire-dominance paradigm
represented an advance when courts first adopted it, for it overcame
their previous refusal to recognize sexual harassment claims at all.
However, the paradigm had inherent problems that would eventually
undermine its utility.221, The judicial interpretation of the paradigm
223 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1750, 1832 (1990).
224 Schultz, supra note 13.
225 Id. at 1692.
226 Id. (alteration in the original).
227 Id. at 1698.
228 Id. at 1704.
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falls into the error-which Schultz also attributes to the first feminist
theorists of sexual harassment, including MacKinnon-of conflating
sexual exploitation and sex inequality.
229
Schultz argues that the desire-dominance paradigm's insistence
on sexual conduct as the defining characteristic of sexual harassment
claims has led courts to disregard nonsexual conduct that also creates
hostile work environments for women. The focus on sexual conduct
in both judicial and popular understandings tends to distract from the
inequality-producing harm fundamental to placing sexual harassment
as a wrong within Title VII, and instead creates the misleading impres-
sion that sexual misconduct is the primary evil.230 More significant,
according to Schultz, is what she calls the "disaggregation" by the
courts of sexual and nonsexual harassing conduct.23l In some in-
stances, courts have separated sexual and nonsexual harassing con-
duct into factually and legally distinct claims, and in others have dis-
232missed the nonsexual claims altogether. Thus, as Schultz shows, in
case after case, courts would artificially split into sexual and nonsexual
components a single course of harassing conduct that undermined a
woman employee. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,233 for example, the lower
courts considered only the sexual misconduct directed at the plaintiff
Theresa Harris and failed to give weight to such facts as her being the
only manager at the company to be denied an individual office, com-
pany car, and allowance and that she was required to serve coffee to
the other managers at meetings.234 One result of such disaggregation
is that the plaintiff's burden of proof is unreasonably heightened. Be-
cause a sexual harassment plaintiff must show the hostile environment
to have been severe or pervasive, disaggregation would tend to make
the two separate pieces of the case each seem less severe. Moreover,
because the plaintiff must also prove the harassing conduct was "be-
cause of sex," courts would often dismiss the nonsexual part of the
claim as lacking in proof of sex bias.
Schultz's corrective to this pervasive error by the lower courts is to
reconceptualize sexual harassment by replacing the sexual desire-
229 Id. at 1705-09.
W% Id. at 1693-96. "Harassment cases have highlighted the harm of conduct con-
sidered sexual, while the larger gender-based processes once deemed the principal fo-
cus of Title VII have faded from view." Id. at 1739.
231 Id. at 1713.
232 Id. at 1714-16.
233 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
234 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1710-11.
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dominance paradigm with what she calls a "competence-centered"
paradigm. Sexual harassment should be understood as any conduct,
whether or not sexual, "that has the purpose or effect of undermining
the perceived or actual competence of women (and some men) who
threaten the idealized masculinity of those who do the work." 235 Such
a broader understanding better captures the reality of workplace har-
assment of women, which is not necessarily motivated by "men's desire
to exploit or dominate women sexually," but always has "the form and
function of denigrating women's competence for the purpose of
keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or incorporating them
as inferior, less capable workers."23 6 The competence-centered ac-
count would recognize the full range of harassing conduct that "sub-
vert[s] a woman's perceived or actual competence," including non-
sexual verbal denigration as well as such common nonsexual harassing
techniques as denial of adequate training and mentoring, assigning
unfair or impossible tasks, ostracism, and sabotage.13' For Schultz,
then, not all workplace sexual conduct is discrimination because of
sex, and more importantly not all discriminatory harassment because
of sex is sexual conduct. In essence, Schultz views the idea of a direct
causal nexus between sexual conduct and sex discrimination as a mis-
take; it is the competence-undermining effect of sexual harassment
that mediates and causally connects sexual conduct to "sex."
2. Heteropatriarchy as Discrimination Because of Sex
Whereas Schultz's reconceptualization of the law is driven by the
need to correct the mistake of disaggregating sexual from nonsexual
harassing conduct, Katherine Franke's analysis is driven primarily by
the failure of sexual harassment law to provide a coherent or princi-
pled resolution of same-sex harassment cases. In What's Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?, Franke suggests that it is necessary to return to
first principles in order to resolve such cases. 2 ' According to Franke,
"[t] he fact that sexual harassment is a sexually discriminatory wrong is
not a legal conclusion necessarily revealed in the text of Title VII.
Rather it requires an argument."239 But courts have failed to make an
argument; instead they have come to accept a sex per se rule in con-
235 Id. at 1762.
236 Id. at 1755.
237 Id. at 1764-65.
238 Franke, supra note 13.
2.9 Id. at 702.
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clusory fashion. "IT]he conclusion that conduct of a sexual nature
was 'based on sex' has come to go without saying .... The jurispru-
dential shorthand by which courts have come to assume that some
sexual conduct is sex discrimination, frequently reflects a kind of ju-
risprudential laziness that is best stirred from its malaise."
240
Although Franke begins with the provocative assertion that the
time has come to make a new effort to answer the "seemingly simple"
question "why is [sexual harassment] sex discrimination?,"2 4 it
emerges that the real focal point of her analysis is the causation ele-
ment of sexual harassment claims. Hence the question she poses
could properly be restated as "why is sexual conduct because of sex?"
Franke sees the existing answers to this question as falling into three
categories: "(1) the equality principle: the conduct would not have
been undertaken but for the plaintiffs sex; (2) the anti-sex principle:
the conduct was discriminatory precisely because it was sexual; and
(3) the antisubordination principle: the conduct subordinated
women to men."242 To Franke, these approaches, developed by femi-
nist theorists and litigators, were beneficial in overcoming the initial
judicial hostility to recognizing sexual harassment as a violation of Ti-
tle VII, but each is flawed and incomplete as a theoretical account.
Under the equality principle, Title VII is designed to promote a
meritocratic ideal by requiring workplaces to be color- and sex-blind.
Franke credits Catharine MacKinnon with demonstrating that sexual
harassment violates formal equality principles because it "'limits
women in a way men are not limited. It deprives them of opportuni-
ties that are available to male employees without sexual conditions.'
So understood, it amounts to disparate treatment of women based on
their biological sex...., 43 This argument defines Title VII's because
of sex requirement either in terms of but for cause (the conduct
would not have been directed at the plaintiff "but for" her sex) or
comparative disadvantage ("whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed"2 44). Although Franke her-
self elides these two slightly distinct analytical approaches into a single
240 Id. at 694.
241 Id. at 691.
242 Id. at 704.
243 Id. at 706 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 40).
244 Franke, supra note 13, at 712 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
25 (1993) (Ginsburg,J., concurring)).
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"equality" approach,2 5 she is undoubtedly correct when she concludes
that courts have overwhelmingly relied on a formal equality approach
to determine whether sexual harassment is discrimination because of
sex, and that they have done so because of "the natural inclination to
turn to something familiar when in foreign or uncomfortable terri-
tory.
246
The problem with the formal equality approach, according to
Franke, is that it begs the question of why sexual conduct directed by a
man toward a woman in the workplace is because of sex. The expla-
nation, often unstated, is that (hetero) sexual desire is only and always
directed at the opposite sex, and a man's sexual advance on a woman
therefore establishes that her sex is a "but for cause" of his harassing
conduct. This explanation fails to explain why cases of sexual conduct
not motivated by sexual desire are deemed "because of sex" in male-
female harassment cases. Moreover, when a sexual-desire account is
used in same-sex cases, the result is that actionable same-sex harass-1 • 247
ment is typically limited to harassment perpetrated by homosexuals.
Harassment motivated by the impulse to coerce conformity with het-
erosexist gender norms usually escapes liability.
Franke has not set out to bolster the sex per se rule by providing
the missing theoretical support, but rather to bury it. She thus pro-
ceeds to critique those feminist theorists who have argued, typically in
conclusory fashion, that what makes sexual harassment a form of sex
discrimination is "'precisely the fact that it is sexual.' 248 Courts seem
to have relied in many cases on this "mere conclusion posing as argu-
ment,"249 but have failed to explain their decisions: In most cases, an
allegation of sexual conduct in a harassment case means that "the in-
ference or conclusion" of "based on sex" "is automatically drawn, and
no theory is advanced as to why it is legitimate to use such an eviden-
245 Id. at 712-13 ("Construed according to formal equality principles, the wrong of
sex discrimination amounts to the dissimilar treatment of otherwise similarly situated
workers. Thus, where women are treated differently than men in the workplace, they
are being discriminated against because of their sex .... ). They differ insofar as "but
for" causation need not be based on comparative evidence. Supra part I.B.1.
246 Franke, supra note 13, at 713.
247 Id. at 714.
248 Id. (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991)); see
also Marcosson, supra note 94, at 14-15 (arguing that "the sexual content of the har-
assment is enough [to constitute sex discrimination], regardless of whether the har-
asser is motivated by the target's gender").
249 Franke, supra note 13, at 720.
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tiary shortcut.",
50
The "anti-sex principle" identified by Franke proves to be nothing
more than a vacuous version of the third argument-the "antisubor-
dination principle"-which offers a more robust account of the idea
that workplace sexual conduct amounts automatically to sex discrimi-
nation. Franke identifies antisubordination theory with that articu-
lated by feminist theorists who were instrumental in the development
of sexual harassment doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly
Catharine MacKinnon and Susan Estrich.25" ' MacKinnon has argued,
for example, that a discriminatory "sex stereotype is present in the
male attitude, expressed through sexual harassment, that women are
sexual beings whose privacy and integrity can be invaded at will, be-
ings who exist for men's sexual stimulation and gratification.
2 5 2
MacKinnon, according to Franke, has devoted her career to demon-
strating that "male sexual behavior is, in some sense, fundamentally
sexist" and "is the principal form and means of women's domina-
tion. "21' Franke, for her part, rejects these ideas. The "impulse to col-
lapse sexism with sex," as she calls it, reduces female sexuality to pas-
254sive victimization. Moreover, says Franke, by reducing sexuality and
sexual harassment to something that men do to women, MacKinnon's
antisubordination theory fails to recognize the oppressive process of
creation and reinforcement of gender roles that results from sexual
harassment.
255
But even MacKinnon's flawed theory, Franke argues, is needed to
make the logical link between current sexual harassment doctrine and
the subordination of women. Only if sex is inherently subordinating
does it make sense that harassing sexual conduct is per se because of256
sex. Nevertheless, Franke argues, MacKinnon's radical feminism
has rarely, if ever, been accepted by courts, thus leaving the judicial
recognition of a sex per se rule lacking a coherentjustification.
257
Franke offers a revised antisubordination account to replace both
250 Id. at 719.
251 Id. at 714-16, 725-29.
252 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 179.
253 Franke, supra note 13, at 715, 728-29.
254 Id. at 762.
255 Id. at 762-71.
256 Id. at 728-29.
257 Franke contends that MacKinnon's argument that male sexuality inherently
subordinates women "is either too complicated or too radical for most judges," who
instead simply accept the conclusion that sex is sexist "according to a jaundiced analy-
sis as to why." Id. at 729.
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the theoretically vacuous formal equality theory and MacKinnon's
"sex equals sexism" antisubordination theory. According to Franke,
"one of the ultimate goals of antidiscrimination laws is, and I believe it
should be, to provide all people more options with respect to how
they do their gender."258  Therefore, it is necessary to account for
same-sex harassment in cases such as one where the victimized man is
subordinated for failing to conform to the norm of the sufficiently*
masculine, heterosexual male. For Franke, sexual harassment com-
prises those practices that police or enforce "hetero-patriarchal gen-
der norms."25 9 Franke's argument about sexual harassment follows
from her argument made elsewhere, that sex discrimination law has
committed a fundamental error by assuming the existence of two im-
mutable biological sexes, each of which carries an inextricable gen-
der. 6° Once biological sex and gender are disaggregated, it becomes
(relatively) plain that the discriminatory pattern evident in sexual
harassment cases is not biological men subordinating biological
women, but rather hetero-masculine men subordinating everyone
else.
Even the more nuanced feminist versions of antisubordination
theory fail to account for the same-sex instances of this discriminatory
pattern, Franke argues. As same-sex harassment cases began to rise to
prominence in the early- to mid-1990s, Abrams, as well as Schultz and
others, have tried to fit harassment of gender-nonconforming men
into their antisubordination theory.261 Typically they have done so by
theorizing such harassment as an epiphenomenon of the subordina-
tion of women: it is sexism displaced onto men, or men feminized or
treated as women.262 Franke objects to this perspective as mistaken:
Our thinking and our theory must resist the urge to regard maleness and
femaleness, and masculinity and femininity, as opposites, rather than as
two locations on a spectrum of sexual and gendered identity. To label
all bias against nonmasculine men as a kind of discrimination against
258 Id. at 758.
259 Id. at 772.
20 Franke, supra note 26, at 5.
261 Abrams, supra note 20, at 2438-39; Abrams, supra note 13, at 1225-29; Case, su-
pra note 27, at 46-57; Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple
Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 124-30
(1992); Schultz, supra note 13, at 1774-89.
262 See also MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 10 ("Men who are sexually as-
saulted are thereby stripped of their social status as men. They are feminized: made to
serve the function and play the role customarily assigned to women as men's social in-
feriors.").
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women is to ignore the role that sexism plays in regulating male identity
in a way that is related to, but not necessarily the same as, the role it
plays in regulating female identity.
263
For Franke, it seems, viewing sexism as something men do to women
tends to fall into the error long ago identified by feminists, that it is
not enough simply for antidiscrimination law to remove barriers to
equality-such as harassing conduct. If the baseline norm-equal to
what?-remains masculine, then the nonmasculine will always be sub-
ordinate.2 4 But the goal of workplace equality should not be to allow
everyone to be a man.
Franke contends that harassing sexual conduct is not discrimina-
tion "because of sex" on the face of it, and that the link between sex-
ual conduct and sex discrimination requires an argument: sexual
harassment is a "technology" of sexism, she argues, meaning that it is
a means to a wrong.265 What's wrong with sexual harassment is not that
it is sexual, but rather its effect of producing heteropatriarchy in the
workplace. The workplace dominance of heteropatriarchy thus medi-
ates and causally connects sexual conduct and the category "sex" pro-
tected under Title VII.
3. Broadening Traditional Antisubordination Theory
In The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, Kathryn Abrams
takes issue with reconceiving sexual harassment in ways that shift the
primary focus away from the subordination of women, a flaw which
she finds in the two theoretical accounts she discusses, by Franke and
Anita Bernstein. Nevertheless, Abrams agrees that sexual harassment
doctrine needs to be fixed: "If we hope to modify or reconstruct sex-
ual harassment doctrine, we need a coherent account of where exist-
ing doctrine is going wrong, and, perhaps more importantly, a recon-
ceptualization of the real problem to be remedied through sexual
harassment litigation."
266
Abrams further elaborates the antisubordination theory of sexual
harassment that she has developed over several years. For example,
she has argued that sexual harassment is:
263 Franke, supra note 13, at 758.
264 See Case, supra note 27, at 72 (" [B] eing 'feminine' is viewed as the negation of a
number of character traits classified as masculine."); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1382-83 (1985) ("Paradigmatic male
values, like objectivity, are defined as exclusive .....
265 Franke, supra note 13, at 762.
266 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1184.
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either a form of gender discrimination against women--derision of
some of the qualities that make women targets for sexual harassment-
or a form of gender discrimination against men that disciplines not the
group but a distinct subset for abandoning the qualities associated with
men for the more socially stigmatized characteristics associated with
267
women.
According to Abrams, sexual harassment "has emerged as a means of
preserving male control over the workplace."
268 Abrams's revised anti-
subordination theory is designed to broaden the understanding of
sexual harassment so that it can recognize various forms of harassing
behavior and the complex identities of sexual harassment claimants.
This broader understanding would include recognition of male-on-
male harassment claims, even though the understanding is grounded
on a theory of sex discrimination as subordination of women: Al-
though most sexual harassment is aimed at women, male-on-male
harassment also can be sexist by "asserting the primacy of male pre-
rogatives or norms in the workplace."269
Although she moves the understanding of sexual harassment be-
yond MacKinnon's male-sexuality-as-domination view, Abrams, unlike
Franke or Schultz, does not appear at all invested in a rejection of
MacKinnon. According to Abrams, it is not that MacKinnon wrongly
conflates sexism with sex (as Franke contends), but rather that the so-
cial conditions have changed since MacKinnon wrote in 1979. "As
more women have begun to claim equal status in society and have
sought access to a wider range of jobs, male control over the work-
place is no longer so hegemonic that sexualization and sexual availabil-
ity are built uncontroversially into women's job descriptions," as
MacKinnon had argued.27°
Perhaps more than anyone in recent years, Abrams has been con-
sistently attentive to the need of sexual harassment theorists to speak
in a practical way to courts. In The New Jurisprudence, Abrams takes
pains to consider how her theoretical assertions should affect legal
doctrine by outlining the basic elements of a hostile environment sex-
ual harassment claim. 27' Three points about her discussion are signifi-
cant to my argument. First, Abrams identifies the unwelcomeness
element-not the causation element-as the means for "the recogni-
267 Abrams, supra note 20, at 2516.
268 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1206.
269 Id. at 1209.
270 Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
271 Id. at 1220-21.
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tion and depiction of women's [sexual] agency," 72 a point with which
I strongly agree, as discussed further below. However (and second),
Abrams does not develop a clear position on the place of sexual con-
duct within the theoretical understanding of sexual harassment.
2 7
Third, Abrams agrees with Franke that "[t]he based-on-sex require-
ment.., needs substantial revision," and she goes on to define that
element as "connected with the enforcement of a sex and gender hi-
erarchy.", 74 Like Franke and Schultz, Abrams settles for a very com-
plex definition of this threshold causation element in order to resolve
the problems of essentialism, which are further discussed in the fol-
lowing Section.
B. The Lack of Necessity to Abandon the Sex Per Se Rule
For Franke and Schultz, the sex per se rule is inextricably associ-
ated with MacKinnon's theory that male sexuality is inherently subor-
dinating, making male sexual conduct in the workplace per se dis-
crimination "because of sex." Thus, they assert that the sex per se rule
must be abandoned because it interferes with the goals they seek to
advance: for Schultz, to include nonsexual claims of harassment, and
for Franke (and secondarily for Schultz), to move to an understand-
ing of harassment as gender subordination more broadly conceived.
Further, both believe that a sex per se rule demeans women's sexual
agency: it necessarily conceives of women as automatic victims of sex-
ual conduct. Abrams does not find it necessary to reject MacKinnon,
yet at the same time she perceives no particular need to defend a sex
per se rule; moreover, she seems in accord with Schultz and Franke's
perceived need to restructure the causation inquiry to address the
problems of female sexual agency, nonsexual harassment, and same-
sex harassment. On closer examination, however, it appears that the
sex per se rule is not to blame for these problems, and getting rid of it
is not necessary to address them.
272 Id. at 1222.
273 Abrams quotes the pre-Oncale element of a hostile environment claim as con-
sisting of "'unwelcome'... requests for sexual favors or verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature." Id. at 1221. Focusing on the "unwelcomeness" aspect of the element,
Abrams does not consider the inconsistency of the sexual definition of the conduct
and her subsequent point that "[a]s Vicki Schultz correctly observes, for non-sexual
fofms of sexual harassment... unwelcomeness should be assumed." Id.
/ 274 Id. at 1223 (internal quotations omitted).
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1. The Problem of Female Sexual Agency
Both Franke and Schultz express the concern that relying on sex-
ual conduct as a touchstone for the sex-discriminatory quality of sex-
ual harassment-equating sexuality with sexism-will repress benign
sexual expression and undermine female sexual agency. Schultz ar-
gues that "[s]exual relations (heterosexual or otherwise) do not in-
herently enact male dominance over women," thus aligning herself
with the modem trend of "feminist scholarship that criticizes earlier
feminist thought for conflating gender inequality and (heterosexual)
sexual relations."27 5 But the sexual desire-dominance paradigm, by
equating sexuality with sexism, results in both an unduly paternalistic
concern for women's sexual sensibilities and unduly oppressive efforts
to purge all traces of sexuality from the workplace. Such efforts,
Schultz further asserts, are doomed to fail, and only will succeed in
generating resistance to sexual harassment laws and give feminism a
276
bad name. Franke puts forth a similar objection:
1, for one, am not prepared to say that the expression of sexuality in the
workplace is presumptively illegitimate. Shutting down all sexual behav-
ior seems like an overreaction to the problem of sexual harassment, and
requires some very disturbing assumptions about the possibility of fe-
male sexual agency: since the law has done a bad job of differentiating
welcome from unwelcome sexual conduct, better to declare it all unwel-
277
come.
For both Franke and Schultz, the redefinition of the essential wrong
of sexual harassment solves this problem by shifting the focus away
from sexual conduct per se to subordinating conduct.
The persuasive force of these criticisms should not keep us from
looking carefully at the real identity of their target. If the target is the
courts or prevailing legal doctrine, then their criticism may be some-
what misplaced. Prevailing doctrine has not, in fact, seriously at-
tempted to banish all sexual expression from the workplace. The On-
cale opinion treads on familiar ground when it reminds us that " [it] he
prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexual-
ity nor androgyny in the workplace." 278 Schultz, for her part, seems to
go too far in identifying the prevailing legal doctrine in sexual har-
assment laws with the views of MacKinnon. The sexual desire-
275 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1790 n.541.
276 Id. at 1793-94.
277 Franke, supra note 13, at 746.
278 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
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dominance paradigm, which Schultz claims governs the law of sexual
harassment, assumes that all sexually harassing conduct is motivated
either by sexual attraction ("desire") or an impetus to dominate
women sexually.! Franke offers a more nuanced view of MacKin-
non's influence, in which the prevailing doctrine of sexual harassment
in the courts is a watered-down MacKinnonism stripped of its theo-
retical underpinnings: "One might conclude from the Meritor deci-
sion that the Court embraced the notion that sexual harassment is
about sex-based power, while refusing MacKinnon's fundamental in-
sight that the subordination of women is always sexual."'28 To be sure,
MacKinnon's equation of "sexism with sex" always raises a specter of a
political alliance with the censorious, the prudish, or other conserva-
tive forces, particularly on the subject of pornography. As an em-
pirical matter, however, it would be hard to show that this has hap-
pened in sexual harassment cases, where the courts' frequent
insensitivity to gross sexual abuse of female employees has been much
remarked upon by feminist commentators and employee rights advo-
cates. 8 '
On closer examination, the Franke and Schultz argument about
female sexual agency is an argument not with the courts but with
MacKinnon's antisubordination theory. Given MacKinnon's stature
both as a founder of sexual harassment doctrine and as a major figure
in feminism, this is certainly a worthwhile argument to have. But is
the sex per se rule inextricably bound up with MacKinnon's confla-
tion of sexism and sexuality?
I think not. What I refer to as the "sex per se" rule is not MacKin-
non's theory, but rather an evidentiary shortcut to a causation finding.
279 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1692.
280 Franke, supra note 13, at 727.
281 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard Delgado,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1082 n.21 (1988) (arguing that although the "odd" and "un-
natural" alliance of MacKinnon-style feminist activists, conservative Republicans, and
elements of the Religious Right is due mostly to practical political necessities, there are
"deep theoretical similarities in the MacKinnon and conservative approaches to regu-
lating pornography"); Howard Kurtz, New War on Pornography; Librarians Argue with
Preachers over City Law, WASH. POST, July 29, 1984, at A4 (reporting that a proposed In-
dianapolis anti-pornography ordinance "has forged a strange alliance between the
church-going conservatives... and radical feminists such as... Catharine MacKin-
non"); Richard Lacayo, Give-and-Take on Pornography; After Two Court Actions, Still Tough
to Ban but Easier to Banish, TIME, Mar. 10, 1986, at 67 (noting that attempts to attack
pornography have had "the unusual effect of allying some left-leaning feminists and
conservative moralists").
282 For an example, see Schultz, supra note 13, at 1713-20, 1744-48.
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To the extent that it has gained a foothold in doctrine, that does not
provide evidence of judicial acceptance of MacKinnon. Franke and
Schultz both underestimate the possibility that the sex per se rule rep-
resents a judicial intuition reaching toward the broader notion that
sexuality in the workplace is sufficiently likely to be, in Franke's
phrase, a "technology of sexism" that it is worthwhile to shift the fac-
tual inquiry beyond "causation" to the other elements of a sexual har-
assment claim.
It is worth restating some basics at this point. A claim of sexual
harassment that violates Title VII has a number of elements, of which
"because of sex" is only one. The plaintiff in a hostile environment
case must show not only that the conduct was "because of sex," but
also that it was "unwelcome" and "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.' 28' The environment must be both subjec-
tively hostile, meaning that the victim "subjectively perceive[d] the
environment to be abusive," and objectively hostile, meaning "an en-
vironment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.
284
For ease of reference in my discussion it is necessary only to distin-
guish the causation element-whether the complained-of conduct is
"because of sex"-from the remaining elements, which I will refer to
collectively as the "severity" elements.
To conclude that any allegation of sexual harassment is discrimi-
nation because of sex can flow only from the conclusions that the
conduct was both because of sex and that it meets the severity re-
quirements. Courts and commentators are not always careful about
maintaining the distinction between "sex discrimination," as in the
overall finding of liability, and "because of sex," as in conduct that sat-
isfies the causation element. Oncale is a prominent example.
5
Franke and Schultz, too, seem at times to have glossed over this dis-
tinction. Schultz, for example, rejects the notion that "sexuality pro-
vides a bright-line test for delineating when harassment is gender-
based" conduct on the ground that courts have a hard time agreeing
on what conduct counts as sexual. 2' 6 For evidence of this, however,
Schultz relies on cases examining the severity elements rather than
283 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).
284 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
285 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (refer-
ring to proof of causation as giving rise to "the inference of discrimination").
286 Schultz, supranote 13, at 1744-95.
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causation and shows the cases to be flawed not so much because they
fail to distinguish between sexual and nonsexual conduct, but because
they minimize plainly sexual conduct as not sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to violate Title VII. 87 Franke at times seems to treat the con-
cepts of "discrimination" and "because of sex" as if they were inter-
changeable, such as when she states: "I am not inclined to conclude
that the conduct was discriminatory simply because it was sex-
,,288ual .... While MacKinnon may have argued that conduct was dis-
criminatory simply because it was sexual, the courts have not taken
that position: The sexually harassing conduct still must meet the vari-
ous severity elements. Hence, "[t]he prohibition of [sexual] harass-
ment . . . requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the work-
place.,
289
Imprecision on this point can have significant consequences be-
cause it can lead to the incorrect assumption that the "because of sex"
element must be defined theoretically in a way that respects female
sexual agency and leaves a margin for sexuality in the workplace. The
severity elements can serve that function, however, and indeed may be
much better suited to the task. Some sexual conduct in the workplace
is necessarily allowed by sexual harassment doctrine so long as action-
able harassment is confined to conduct meeting the severity elements.
Moreover, the notion of sexual agency at issue-an individual's capac-
ity to exercise self-determination in sexual matters-seems to inhere
in the severity elements of both unwelcomeness and offensiveness.
On the other hand, to the extent that causation is related to the intent
of the harasser, the harassment target's sexual agency fits far less
clearly within the causation rubric.
The Court in Oncale made this error when it assumed that the
"because of sex" requirement is the only thing that prevents Title VII
from becoming that nightmare of employers everywhere, the "general
civility code." The distinction between ."mere incivility" and abusive
harassment does not turn on whether the conduct is sex-based, but is
instead plainly a question of severity. Again, it is not necessary to dis-
pense with the sex per se rule to ward off employer liability for trivial
287 See id. at 1744 (discussing Baskeruille v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428,
430 (7th Cir. 1995), which described allegedly harassing conduct as falling on a spec-
trum with "sexual assaults" on one end and "occasional vulgar banter" on the other);
id. at 1746 n.326 (discussing Cohen v. Litt, 906 F. Supp. 957, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), which
determined that an explicit sexual comment was "too insignificant" to constitute ac-
tionable sexual harassment).
288 Franke, supra note 18, at 1256.
289 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
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sexual misconduct. The severity requirement for sexual harassment
leaves plenty of elbow room for incivility.
2. The Problem of a Sexual-Desire-Based Causation Theory
Sexual desire as a touchstone for the causation inquiry has very lit-
tle to recommend it. As we find in Oncale, the notion that harassment
is "because of sex" when demonstrably based on sexual attraction pos-
its a world of Kinsey zeroes and Kinsey sixes (as Franke trenchantly
points out), in which everyone is sexually attracted either to someone
of the opposite sex if heterosexual, or of the same sex if homosex-
ual. ° Sexual-desire-based causation makes lust the critical motivation
rather than motivations that have more to do with discrimination,
such as an intent to subordinate women or to preserve hetero-male
control over workplaces. This, as discussed above,' opens the door to
intrusive and ugly inquiries into the sexuality of the parties that
should be irrelevant in a case of sex-based employment discrimina-
tion. Moreover, it lends itself to the deplorable "homosexuals only"
rule in which gay harassers become target defendants of Title VII,
whereas non-gay men can harass gender nonconforming men with
impunity.292 Finally, a sexual-desire based understanding of sexual
harassment contributes to the "disaggregation" error-the marked
tendency to focus on sexual conduct to the exclusion of nonsexual
forms of harassment-convincingly documented by Schultz.
Starting with the latter point, is it necessary to abandon a sex per
se rule in order to solve the disaggregation problem? Schultz, in es-
sence, argues that when she criticizes what she calls a "two-tiered
structure of causation" in harassment cases. In this "two-tiered struc-
ture," causation (because of sex) is presumed in sexual conduct cases,
but must be proven with additional evidence in other cases.293 Schultz
contends that this double standard for required proof is part and par-
cel of the courts' relative inattention to nonsexual harassing conduct.
The solution Schultz appears to advocate is that sexual conduct cases
should not be privileged in any way over nonsexual ones in terms of
290 Franke, supra note 13, at 736-37; see KINSEY ET AL., supra note 209, at 638-40
(rating heterosexuality and homosexuality on a zero to six scale based on the fre-
quency of various kinds of sociosexual experiences).
291 Supra text accompanying notes 82-83, 208-32.
292 Supra text accompanying notes 212-17; see also Franke, supra note 13, at 696
(noting the way in which sexual harassment can be used by men to police gender
norms).
293 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1739-40.
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proof. Rejecting sexual conduct as a bright line test , Schultz would
bring sexual and nonsexual harassing conduct within a single causa-
tion standard. Such conduct would be deemed "because of sex" if the
conduct "makes it more difficult for women to develop and express
their capability as workers."
29
Schultz's attack on the sex per se rule is less persuasive than her
central insights about the need for courts to overcome their failure to
recognize nonsexual harassment. The two-tiered structure of proof is
not necessarily either cause or effect of the problem of sexual conduct
overshadowing nonsexual conduct in the perception of unlawful sex-
based harassment. Instead, it may be nothing more than a recogni-
tion that some evidence more clearly reveals its sex basis for Title VII
purposes than other evidence, in the same way that berating a female
employee as "dumb" is less obviously "because of sex" than berating
her, as in Harris, as a "dumb-ass woman."2 9 There is no avoiding the
problem in discrimination cases that facially sex- or race-neutral con-
duct in the workplace is less clearly "because of" sex or race than con-
duct accompanied by sex- or race-specific epithets: There always will
be easy cases and hard cases where intent must be proven. But to
eliminate the two tiers of causation in this context-to equalize the
difficulty in proving causation-will not necessarily advance Schultz's
objective of promoting recognition of nonsexual harassment. Where
a female employee claims that nonsexual harassing conduct was di-
rected at her because of sex, courts are likely to require "additional
proof," either in the form of comparative evidence (similarly situated
men were not treated the same way) or sex-specific remarks by the
harasser. Eliminating two-tiered causation in effect by requiring simi-
lar comparative or sex-specific evidence in sexual conduct cases may
accomplish nothing other than to decree that more proof of causation
will be required in all cases. Sexual conduct cases will no longer be
"easy" cases with regard to establishing the "because of sex" element.
It is far from clear to what extent the sex per se rule is the culprit
in the courts' tendency to favor an underinclusive understanding of
harassment "because of sex." Schultz does not draw a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, harassing sexual conduct motivated by lust or
a desire to "dominate women sexually," and on the other the broader
notion of harassing sexual conduct that serves as a "technology" for
294 Id. at 1744.
295 Id. at 1773-74.
296 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
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undermining women's competence and segregating the workplace by
sex. I suspect that judges who fail to acknowledge broader forms of
sex-based harassment would tend also to adhere to -the narrower de-
sire-based conception of sexual harassment. In any event, as Schultz
recognizes, a number of legal authorities accept a sex per se rule while
at the same time recognizing nonsexual forms of harassment.
97
Moreover, the EEOC has long taken the position that "[s]exual har-
assment is one type of harassment based on sex. However it is not the
only type of unlawful harassment which is sex-based or which stems
from sex discrimination. 298 Thus, the ends advocated by Schultz may
be attainable by strengthening the recognition of this basic insight ar-
ticulated by the EEOC, that any sort of harassment directed at women
is discrimination because of sex, and that sexual harassment is merely
a subset of this larger category of sex-based harassment. In other
words, the disaggregation error can be corrected without abandoning
a sex per se rule.
Nor, more generally, does it seem necessary to abandon a sex per
se rule in order to disabuse courts of a desire-based theory of causa-
tion. A sex per se rule is not the same thing as assuming that sexual
conduct must be based on desire or attraction in order to be because
of sex. Since sexual conduct may be motivated by various reasons-
including the motivations implicit in the notion that sexual
harassment is a "technology of sexism"-to treat sexual conduct as per
297 Schultz acknowledges that not all lower courts have been guilty of disaggrega-
tion, although she concludes that they are in the minority. See Schultz, supra note 13,
at 1732-38 ("[A] ny harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of
employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under
Title VII." (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985))). Schultz's
assertion as to the extent of the disaggregation problem in the lower courts may be
slightly overstated. She cites eight circuits that have recognized the McKinney principle
to some extent, to which could be added at least one more. See Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do not rule out the possibil-
ity both men and women working at Showboat have viable claims.., for sexual har-
assment."). Nevertheless, there is no question that erroneous disaggregating decisions
have been a significant problem.
298 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) § 615.6, at 615:0017 (1982); see also Schultz,
supra note 13, at 1732 n.246 (citing EEOC employment manuals). The proposed 1993
EEOC Guidelines on harassment were not intended to cover sex-based "harassment
that is sexual in nature, which is covered by the Commission's Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of Sex," 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992). EEOC, Guidelines on Harassment
Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,266 (Oct. 1, 1993). The Guidelines were eventually withdrawn due to political
opposition. 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (Oct. 11, 1994).
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se "because of sex" would treat all sexual conduct in the workplace as
more likely than not because of sex, without distinguishing between
harassers motivated by desire and those motivated to preserve the
workplace as a male domain. It would, in effect, make the harasser's
specific motivation irrelevant to the causation issue and thereby solve
the problem of messy inquiries into the harasser's state of mind.
3. Same-Sex Harassment
A concern very much in the foreground for Franke and Abrams,
and secondarily for Schultz, is to solve the conundrum of same-sex
harassment cases. These cases have produced perverse results. On
the one hand, courts that would probably never rely on an antisubor-
dination theory to reject, say, a challenge to an affirmative action plan
by a reverse discrimination plaintiff, seem to rely on antisubordination
selectively to reject same-sex claims: Sexual harassment doctrine, they
say, was designed to protect women, who traditionally have been sub-
ordinated in the workplace, not men.99 On the other hand, a sexual-
desire-based understanding of harassment would tend to allow hetero-
sexual males to sue gay harassers, but not the other way around.
Thus, bolstered by the current exclusion of sexual orientation from
Title VII protection, a class of marginalized and subordinated em-
ployees-gender nonconformists-could be targeted as defendants
but left largely unprotected as plaintiffs. This type of "reverse dis-
crimination" approach to same-sex harassment is arguably indicated
by the Oncale decision.
A sex per se rule does not produce such a result, however. Again,
the culprit is a theory based on sexual desire. Plaintiffs in the gender
nonconformist cases, such as Doe v. City of Belleville, are almost invaria-
bly subjected to sexualized forms of abuse. They would all be able to
show their harassment was "because of sex" under a sex per se rule.
To be sure, so would the heterosexual plaintiff claiming unwanted
sexual attention from a gay harasser. In that sense, the sex per se rule
might be overinclusive (which is no doubt why Franke wants to get rid
299 "The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is
one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the
powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988); accord Ashworth v.
Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ("[T]his Court accepts the
reasoning of the district court in Goluszek, the Fifth Circuit .... and that of the other
district courts who have held that same-sex harassment is not actionable under Title
VII.").
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of it), although it would still be necessary for the plaintiff to show that
the sexual attention was severe. However, that sort of problem-the
recognition of reverse discrimination claims by members of the domi-
nant group-would seem to be inherent in Title VII cases so long as
courts follow a formal equality approach rather than an antisubordi-
nation approach to the statute.
IV. THE CAUSATION PROBLEM IN ANTISUBORDINATION
THEORIES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
How would Lois Robinson prove that the sexual harassment she
experienced was because of sex, if she were to bring her claim today?
Oncale seems to negate the conclusion reached by the Robinson court
that "sexual behavior directed at women [by men] will [by itsel] raise
the inference that the harassment is based on their Se.x 300 Looking at
the facts of her case in terms of the three evidentiary routes in Oncale,
Robinson's harassment did not appear to have been based on sexual
desire.30 1 Her employer could argue that men were subjected to the
same sexualized environment. And while an inference could be
drawn that Robinson's co-workers treated her the way that they did
because they objected to her presence in the workplace, there will be
at least a colorable defense argument that no one objected to Robin-
son being there so long as she, like everyone else, accepted the at-
mosphere of sexual hazing. Perhaps her co-workers would testify that
theyjust wanted her to "fit in" or "be one of the guys."
With no sex per se rule to draw upon, antisubordination theorists
would shift the terms of the argument in a Robinson-type case away
from the conscious intentions of the harassers to something else-and
here is the problem. Antisubordination theories typically glide over
the causation/intent issue. Theorists of antisubordination routinely
place heavy reliance on formulae that target unconscious but inten-
tional discrimination as illegal, yet at the same time fail to come to
grips with the dominant "disparate treatment" requirement that ac-
tionable discrimination be intentional and conscious. Thus, for in-
stance, MacKinnon states that "the only question for litigation is
whether the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the
maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gen-
*0 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
301 Supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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der status." °2 For Franke, "sexual harassment is sex discrimination
precisely because its use and effect police heteropatriarchal gender
norms in the workplace."30 3 Abrams defines sexually harassing actions
as those that "preserve male control and entrench masculine norms in
the workplace."3 0 4 For Schultz, sexual harassment is "conduct that has
the purpose or effect of undermining the perceived or actual compe-
tence of women (and some men) who threaten the idealized mascu-
linity of those who do the work."305 There is a common grammatical
construction in each of these antisubordination theories that bespeaks
vagueness on the causation inquiry: In each case, it is the conduct, not
the actor, that is the subject of the sentence. Moreover, the verb in
each sentence suggests an effect of the conduct, rather than an inten-
tion on the part of the defendant. The defining inquiry is whether
the conduct contributes to a larger structure of domination. Signifi-
candy, it places the focus on the effect of the conduct-a point made
most explicit in Schultz's definition of sexual harassment in terms of
306
its "purpose or effect," but which underlies all of the definitions.
These antisubordination theories, while theoretically coherent
and complete in themselves, have a limitation that I believe affects
most antisubordination arguments. So long as courts tend to adhere
to formal equality arguments first and foremost, and antisubordina-
tion arguments only secondarily and occasionally, antisubordination
advocates are likely to encounter frustration in seeing their theories
influence the development of legal doctrine and resolutions of spe-
cific cases-Oncale standing as a prominent example. There are two
302 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 117 (emphasis added).
303 Franke, supra note 13, at 772.
304 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1172.
305 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1762 (emphasis added).
306 There is a subtle but important distinction between "purpose or effect" as
Schultz uses it here and the EEOC Guidelines' use of that phrase. I understand
Schultz's "purpose or effect" test to tell us when the harassing conduct is because of
sex-hence the important qualifier defining harassment in terms of its attack on work-
ers who "threaten the idealized masculinity" of the workplace. Id. The EEOC Guide-
lines state that the various forms of "conduct of a sexual nature" will constitute harass-
ment where "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (3) (2001). The Guidelines rely on the
sex per se rule to supply the "because of sex" element; whereas the "purpose or effect"
language refers not to causation but to severity. The EEOC means to suggest that sex-
ual (and therefore sex-based) conduct is severe enough to constitute harassment ei-
ther if it did unreasonably interfere with an individual's work performance or even if-
in the case of a particularly thick-skinned worker-it was demonstrably intended so to
interfere.
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main reasons for this disconnect between theory and practice, which I
discuss in the following Sections. First, a complex theory of causation,
in the absence of a sex per se rule, is bound to present plaintiffs with
difficulties in proving and arguing their cases. Second, courts have a
marked preference for clearly text-based arguments when it comes to
construing statutory claims. For these reasons, I argue that antisubor-
dination theorists need to frame their arguments in textual terms-
and, specifically in Title VII cases, to engage closely with the phrase
"because of sex."
A. The Causation Problem Exemplified: Plaintiffs'Proof Problems
Arising from Abandonment of the Sex Per Se Rule
I strongly agree with the fundamental insight that sexually harass-
ing conduct should be judged and identified, in the antisubordination
sense, by its effect. However, antisubordination theorists must, but
typically do not, confront the notion that removing the discrimina-
tor's intention from the definition of harassment is legally problem-
atic.30 7 This is not because basic antidiscrimination law principles
should compel the conclusion that the discriminator's subjective men-
tal state is the key. Indeed, I agree with antisubordination theory that
any intentional act that has the described effect of contributing to a
race- and sex-based caste system should be deemed violative of Title
VII. The analytical focus should be where antisubordination theory
would place it, on the discriminatory conduct rather than what the
discriminator meant by it. The problem with the antisubordination
theories is that they require sophisticated interpretations of this con-
duct in order to determine causation. Ajudge orjury must divine the
307 If they address the motivation question at all, antisubordination theorists have
tended to place undue reliance on statements from cases to the effect that benign mo-
tivations are no defense to discrimination. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) ("[T]he absence of a malevolent motive does not con-
vert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.");
Franke, supra note 13, at 745 ("[C]ontemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence de-
nounces conduct that reflects or ratifies benign, yet nonetheless harmful, actions or
policies .... ."). It is a mistake to read these cases as a departure from a motivation-
based theory of intentional discrimination. Saying that benign motivations are no de-
fense is not the same thing as saying that motivation is irrelevant. Instead the courts,
in cases like Johnson Controls, found direct evidence of a patently sex-based motivation
and concluded that, whether "benignly" motivated or otherwise, the result was a dis-
criminatory harm. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (ac-
knowledging that society's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" often
"was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage").
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"social" or "cultural" meaning of the conduct in order to resolve liabil-
ity questions. Unless judges and jurors are themselves to become
feminists or queer theorists, which seems unlikely, then these broader
theories must reach the law through some mediating idiom, one
which does not require a sophisticated understanding and acceptance
of antisubordination theory.
Schultz, Franke, and Abrams each builds her theory on a sophisti-
cated interpretation of sexual harassment to derive the broader social
meaning of harassing conduct. Acts of sexual harassment, whether or
not sexual, are to be recognized as "because of sex" if they "police
hetero-patriarchal gender norms,,309 "entrench masculine norms,"""
or "undermin [e] the.., competence of women."' The causation in-
quiries implicit in these theories are necessarily difficult and complex.
Are courts and juries to apply these concepts, and, if so, how?
It would be unfair to find fault with these theoretical works, which
have significantly contributed to our understanding of sexual harass-
ment, for not going further to consider questions of implementation
in great detail-questions that could easily fill another article . The
conventions of our discipline realistically and mercifully allow us to
draw parameters around the scope of an article. It is not my intention
to engage in such a fault-finding enterprise. I do, however, wish to
draw attention to the need of antisubordination theorists in the over-
all scheme of things to struggle with the nagging problem of causation
in general. In this specific context, my argument is that, were the
relevant antisubordination theorists to do so, they might well recon-
sider their respective positions on the sex per se rule. Franke, for ex-
ample, expresses some awareness of a need, or at least practical utility,
for reconsidering her theoretical disapproval of the sex per se rule. "I
believe that the inferences courts now draw in traditional
male/female sexual harassment cases make sense," she writes. "They
308 Charles R. Lawrence has argued that determining such social or cultural mean-
ing is something that courts do frequently, and therefore argues that a "cultural mean-
ing test" is a viable means for courts to recognize equal protection violations in acts of
unconscious racism. Lawrence, supra note 64, at 355-62.
309 Franke, supra note 13, at 772.
310 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1172.
311 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1762.
312 It would be more than unfair; in my case, it would be casting stones from be-
hind the walls of a glass house, since I do not claim to have solved the causation prob-
lem from an antisubordination perspective. Other than proposing to restore the sex
per se rule, I have only tentative suggestions to make. Infra text accompanying notes
328-29.
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represent an appropriately efficient method by which female plaintiffs
can prove that they have been discriminated against because of their
sex. " 313 But this nod to practicality is not consistent with Franke's
theoretical argument. The traditional inferences are the very ones
Franke seeks to expose as judicial "laziness." If, as she argues, sexual
conduct per se does not make harassment because of sex, how can the
traditional inferences "make sense" under her theory, however effi-
cient it is to draw them? Some judges will have read her article; how
does Franke propose to "keep,'em down on the farm after they've
seen Paree"? Franke's only theoretical justification for making this
concession to practicality is to say that
[i]n more traditional cases, where a woman alleges that she has been
sexually harassed by a man, a lower quantum of proof is sufficient to
trigger an inference of sex discrimination [read: causation] because
larger cultural norms of women as sex objects and men as sex subjects
have been reproduced in the offending conduct."1 5
While I agree: with that justification for a "lower quantum of proof," I
do not see that it follows from all that Franke has argued. In fact, it
sounds like a reversion to MacKinnon's theory: sexual conduct in
male-female cases is "because of sex" because it reproduces sexist cul-
tural norms.
Abrams, who gives due regard to the question of implementation
of her theoretical arguments, works to bridge the gap between theory
and practice on the causation issue by relying on expert witness testi-
mony. "The entrenchment of masculine norms.., might require ex-
pert testimony both in the cross-sex and same-sex cases. " 31 6 "This tes-
timony, which might be offered by a social psychologist, would include
identification of particular norms as paradigmatically masculine and
discussion of how particular workplace conduct served to entrench
these norms." OP This is a troubling solution for plaintiffs. To begin
with, expert witnesses can be extremely expensive, both in terms of
their own hourly rates and attorney time to prepare them. The cost of
this norms expert would be incurred in every case that reaches the
313 Franke, supra note 13, at 729.
314 See Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1998) (cit-
ing Franke's article); Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 912 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(same).
315 Franke, supra note 13, at 769. Again, Franke sometimes uses the term "dis-
crimination" when she appears to mean "causation."
316 Abrams, supra note 13, at 1223.
317 Id. at 1223 n.272.
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summary judgment stage, since (in contrast to economic experts who
calculate the monetary amount of damages) the norms testimony
would be necessary to prove the prima facie case. Further, I have a
real concern that witnesses who have both the necessary expertise and
the ability to articulate these complex theories persuasively will not be
sufficiently widely available. Jurors and even judges tend to be skepti-
cal of social science experts of this kind.318
On a more fundamental level, each of the above theoretical for-
mulae might require plaintiffs to prove something about the effects or
social meaning of harassment beyond the immediate harm to them-
selves. To date, sexual harassment cases have held consistently that a
plaintiff does not have to show that the workplace was hostile and
abusive for all women, only for herself."" Might a showing of en-
trenchment or policing of "norms" require proof of the effect on the
particular workplace for others-the "message" sent by the harass-
ment? If not, could the defendant defeat a harassment claim by show-
ing that, notwithstanding the abusive environment, the particular har-
assed employee remained resistant to the normative message of the
harassment? Although Schultz does not speak in terms of norm rein-
forcement, her theory is subject to a similar set of questions. If harass-
ing conduct means conduct "designed to undermine a woman's com-
petence,"2 ° are we talking about effects extending beyond a plaintiff
or not? From whose vantage point is the undermining of the plain-
tiffs competence to bejudged-in her own eyes or in those of her co-
workers or supervisors?
321
Nor is it an answer to take the relatively short step from an effects-
based definition of sexually harassing or other discriminatory conduct
to disparate impact theory. It is not surprising that antisubordination
theorists have long been drawn to disparate impact theory as an ex-
318 Even an expert with the reputation of the renowned Dr. Susan Fiske was
greeted with skepticism by some of the Justices in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. See 490
U.S. 228, 293 n.5 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Price Waterhouse chose not to
object to Fiske's testimony... but I think the plurality's enthusiasm for Fiske's conclu-
sions unwarranted.").
319 See, e.g., Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing fac-
tual inquiry as "necessarily individualized").
320 Schultz, supra note 13, at 1769.
321 Undermining competence, furthermore, seems to require proof of a level of
severity that exceeds the current standard of whether the harassment "'ma[d]e it more
difficult to do the job."' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.
1988)).
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emplar,322 and have tended to argue for universal or wider application
of a disparate impact theory. Disparate impact theory is an expres-
sion of the antisubordination principle within Title VII,3 24 and it by
definition avoids an inquiry into the harasser's motives.
But antisubordination theorists should avoid the temptation to
rely entirely on disparate impact theory for two reasons. First, prag-
matically speaking, disparate impact theory is not on the ascendancy
in Title VII jurisprudence, nor is there reason to believe that an impe-
tus to overrule Washington v. Davis,32 5 which rejected a disparate im-
pact theory of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, is on
the horizonY Second, and more importantly, disparate impact the-
ory aims at a wrong that is quite simply different from a class of harass-
ing conduct that has the "purpose or effect" of subordinating women.
There is a very important difference between facially neutral employ-
ment practices that have a disparate impact (such as testing instru-
ments or height-weight requirements) but that might be defensible
under some degree of business necessity, and intentional but uncon-
scious discriminatory conduct. The latter reflects more intentional
connections to perpetuating a caste system; whether it is conscious
sexism/racism or more subtle cognitive bias, intentional discrimina-
tion always lacks business justification and deserves greater blame. A
harasser in the Doe or Oncale cases who does not understand that his
actions "police hetero-patriarchal gender norms" is not discriminating
"unintentionally" or "sex-neutrally" within the meaning of disparate
impact theory. His is not a facially sex- (or gender-) neutral practice
with an arguable business justification. Rather, he is committing in-
tentional acts that discriminate; the difference is, his discrimination is
not a conscious "reason" in the sense that Title VII cases traditionally
have required. There are sound reasons in policy for maintaining the
322 E.g., MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 206-08.
323 See, e.g., Case, supra note 27, at 5 (advocating disparate impact analysis for dis-
crimination targeted at gender); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race,
and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1034 (1986) ("The disparate impact ap-
proach would be more successful in combating ... barriers to equality.... ").
324 Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1978);
David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on Reverse Discrimi-
nation, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 657, 672-73.
325 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
326 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
565 (1997) (discussing Washington v. Davis and concluding that "[m]any times the
Court has reaffirmed this principle, that discriminatory impact is not sufficient to prove
a racial classification").
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distinction: disparate impact requires proof of the broader effects of a
policy beyond the individual case-typically in the form of statistics-
whereas intentional discrimination cases typically do not require such
proof. It would be burdensome to shift sexual harassment plaintiffs
into the disparate impact mode of proof.
327
A useful exercise for considering how an antisubordination argu-
ment could be implemented within legal rules of decision is to submit
the theory to a 'jury instruction test.3 28 That is: take the theory and
write it up in the form of a set of jury instructions. Jury instructions,
of course, are the mode in which the legal system explains the law to
lay jurors in order to guide their analysis of the facts of a case as they
try to reach a verdict. For instance:
(1) Workplace harassment must be "because of sex" to violate Title VII.
Harassing workplace conduct is "because of sex" if the conduct made it
more difficult for the plaintiff to do herjob because she is a woman; or
(2) Harassing workplace conduct is "because of sex" if the conduct has
any tendency to further the control of (heterosexual) men in the work-
place.
I suggest not that these examples would implement successfully
the theories of Schultz, Abrams, or Franke, but rather that the exer-
cise shows the host of difficulties raised in trying to summarize those
theories in a way that accurately reflects their gist and at the same time
conforms to the idioms and limitations of the jury instruction form.
Jury instructions require a complex effort at balancing the subtleties
of the law against the need to explain the law to laypeople in a plain,
user-friendly way. When it comes to ideas that are unfamiliar or dis-
agreeable to them, judges are not wholly unlike jurors in the degree
to which they require the ideas to be broken down into a usable, say-
327 Thus, I have serious reservations about Mary Anne Case's argument that cer-
tain forms of gender discrimination-those intentional discriminatory acts targeting
individuals because of their feminine or masculine traits-should be analyzed as dispa-
rate impact claims. Case, supra note 27, at 5, 75-80. Case is very persuasive in her fun-
damental argument that much of what is, or should be, recognized as actionable sex
discrimination under Tide VII is actually discrimination against the feminine, or dis-
crimination because the gender of the worker does not match the presumed gender of
the job. I cannot see, however, how discrimination because of gender is ever suffi-
ciently unconnected to sex to view it as a "sex-neutral" practice and therefore within
disparate impact analysis. To make such a concession seems to me to play into the
hands of those who now argue that sexual orientation is so unconnected to sex as to
fall outside Title VII.
328 This idea is inspired by Anita Bernstein, who submits her proposed "respectful
person" standard for sexual harassment cases to just such a test. Bernstein, supra note
13, at 522-24.
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able, thinkable form. Therefore, the jury instruction test is also a use-
ful proxy for testing the judicial utility of a theory.
A complex theoretical argument as to why harassing sexual con-
duct is because of sex at best takes up time and space for plaintiffs'
lawyers writing their oppositions to motions for summary judgment.
Worse, it could require extra, previously unnecessary proof in the
form of expensive expert testimony. Worst of all, it could give courts
the option of not buying the theory, or the proof, and dismissing cases
alleging harassing sexual conduct as not "because of sex." These po-
tential difficulties also highlight the contrasting advantage, helpful to
all participants in the litigation process, of the sex per se rule as an
129evidentiary shortcut to proof of a prima facie case.
B. The Need to Make Textual Arguments in Title VII Cases
The answer to the causation problem in antisubordination theory
is not necessarily to fix them by coming up with more user-friendly
formulations of the wrong of sexual harassment that meet the jury in-
struction test. Perhaps sophisticated accounts of the "social meaning"
of discriminatory acts are an inherent feature of antisubordination
theory. Even if they are not, there remains the problem that courts
generally have not accepted antisubordination theory over formal
equality theory in discrimination cases. Moreover, courts have tended
to look for textually based arguments in discrimination cases rather
than holistic, purposive understandings. This fact requires antisubor-
dination theorists to proceed on two tracks, just as MacKinnon did in
Sexual Harassment of Working Women by making two types of argu-
ments together.
The debate between advocates of a formal equality theory of dis-
crimination and an antisubordination theory of discrimination goes
back to the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act itself. Under
"formal equality" principles, Title VII is colorblind, and is designed to
"prohibit racial discrimination in employment simpliciter .... [Title
VII] prohibits a covered employer from considering race when mak-
329 To be sure, employers might well gain a tactical advantage in litigation where
the complex elements of a claim make plaintiff's proof burden more complicated and
onerous. But the "bright line" nature of the sex per se rule simplifies the litigated is-
sues for everyone. Moreover, clear, understandable elements of a cause of action
make it easier for employers to comply with the law, and thereby avoid litigation alto-
gether.
330 MACKINNON, supra note 21.
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ing an employment decision, whether the race be black or white."331
Similarly, under this view, Title VII is sex-blind and prohibits employ-
ers from considering sex in employment decisions.332 This approach,
which MacKinnon calls the "differences" approach, makes little or no
reference to the historical or current social realities of subordination
and fully embraces "reverse discrimination" claims, treating discrimi-
nation against women or minorities as no worse than "discrimination"
against white/hetero males. Moreover, as MacKinnon argues, when
applied 'to sex discrimination, the formal equality approach allows
some differential treatment of women-even if it works to the disad-
vantage of women-if it can be shown to be "rationally" based on sex
differences.3
The antisubordination theory of discrimination-which I have re-
ferred to elsewhere as the "protected class" theory-"derives its mean-
ing from real-world conditions of discrimination, both historical and
contemporary, and from the historical contexts of the relevant enact-
ments."334 This vision of Title VII holds that the primary purpose of
Title VII was "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fos-
tered racially [or sexually] stratifiedjob environments to the disadvan-
tage of minority [or female] citizens. 335 While the formal equality or
"colorblind/sex-blind" approach to discrimination has undoubtedly
held sway over the judicial mind in the majority of discrimination
cases, the antisubordination or "protected class" vision has been an
animating spirit that surfaces from time to time. 6
There are several possible explanations why formal equality argu-
331 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (1979) (Rehnquist,J.,
dissenting).
332 SeeJohnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Title VII was "a guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for em-
ployment determinations").
333 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 101-02.
334 Schwartz, supra note 324, at 664.
335 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); see Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (applying the McDon-
nell Douglas quote to sex discrimination).
336Antisubordination arguments have been adopted by courts in the handful of
cases where it has been necessary to see through seemingly benign, but paternalistic
differential treatment. Supra note 307. It is important to keep sight of the strong anti-
subordination roots in Title VII and therefore to avoid the suggestion that antisubor-
dination is somehow a revisionist interpretation of the civil rights laws. See Schwartz,
supra note 324, at 671-74 (arguing that "protected class" theory governed the early Ti-
tle VII cases Griggs and McDonnell Douglas, before giving way to decisions driven by col-
orblind theory).
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ments dominate antidiscrimination caselaw. First, it appeals broadly
to an easily stated and basic notion of fairness, that like cases should
be treated alike. Moreover, formal equality does produce a just out-
come in many clear-cut cases of discrimination. In early sex discrimi-
nation cases, "it worked extraordinarily well for [litigator and profes-
sor Ruth Bader] Ginsburg and her legions. 337 At the same time, as
has often been noted, it limits the potential of antidiscrimination law
to accomplish profound change in the present caste system. Formal
equality theory fails to address societal, discrimination that cannot be
blamed on an identifiable discrimination "villain"; it takes a male
framework as the objective point of reference; 33 and, when consid-
ered alone without input from antisubordination theory, it provides
the winning edge for arguments against affirmative action.3 3 9 Formal
equality is "elementary fairness" without redistribution. For this rea-
son, a formal equality theory of discrimination appeals to many politi-
cal and judicial moderates and conservatives. Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 built broad
political consensus for the Act by suppressing views more expressive of
antisubordination .4°
Within the judiciary, even the most liberal judges have relied
upon formal equality theory in discrimination cases, for example justi-
fying affirmative action not in antisubordination terms, but as a per-
missible exception to a rule of sex/colorblindness.3 4' To be sure, most
judges are doubtless not accomplished feminist thinkers, and the lan-
guage of antisubordination does not come naturally to them. But
there is something more: the possibility that formal equality reason-
ing, despite its oft-noted theoretical incoherence, is easier for judges
to apply than antisubordination theory. In the context of discrimina-
tion and harassment cases, formal equality theory avoids the necessity
for fact-intensive inquiries into motivation. If sex discrimination is de-
337 Scales, supra note 264, at 1374; see, e.g., Mary Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract
Equality, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 201, 201 (noting that women's rights advocates
"[t]hroughout the seventies.., agreed that formal equality was the most appropriate
general standard").
338 See, e.g., Scales, supra note 264, at 1376-80 (detailing the "[t]yranny of
[o]bjctivity").
39 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 324, at 684 ("Once they let colorblindness in the
door at all, racial balancers necessarily acknowledge that affirmative action ... is dis-
crimination.").
340 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 303
(1994) ("Once the civil rights bill became law, the suppressed points of view came to
the surface.").
341 Schwartz, supra note 324, at 680-82.
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fined as "expos[ing members of one sex] to disadvantageous terms or
conditions to which members of the other sex are not exposed,"3 2
then some thorny proof problems are obviated. Once there is an in-
tentional act that disadvantages one employee, proof of discrimina-
tion becomes a question of inferring that the act was motivated in
whole or in part by impermissible consideration of race, sex, etc.
Such a motive can be proved without a direct window into the sexist
mind of the discriminator, and possibly without any proof at all be-
yond the differential treatment itself.
Formal equality theory has a further advantage over antisubordi-
nation theory that appeals to the judicial mind, aside from its appar-
ently neutral and countercritical substance. A formal equality inter-
pretation of Title VII lends itself to a straightforward textual
argument. A mechanical, linguistic parsing of the pertinent statutory
language: "discrimination . . .because of' can readily be translated
into "differential treatment motivated (consciously) by." Taking a dic-
tionary to each term seems in itself a kind of value-neutral, 'Judicial"
act of statutory interpretation that conforms itself to the will of Con-
gress. That is a controversial point, of course, but it seems more pal-
atable to most judges than adopting the posture of a critical theorist,
deconstructionist, or even a cutting edge theorist of statutory interpre-
tation. The words "discrimination because of sex" sound, to the ears
of most judges, as though they mean, quite simply, "expos[ing mem-
bers of one sex] to disadvantageous terms or conditions to which
members of the other sex are not exposed."343
In contrast, antisubordination theories take a holistic approach to
the statutory prohibition "discrimination because of sex." Such theo-
ries understand the phrase as a statutory expression of an overall pur-
pose of outlawing practices that create a sex-defined hierarchy of men
over women. This purposivist antisubordination approach is captured
in MacKinnon's contention that in sex discrimination cases, "[t]he
only question for litigation is whether the policy or practice in ques-
tion integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a
deprived position because of gender status., 344 As reflected in their
respective formulations of causation, the theories articulated by
Franke, Schultz, and Abrams are likewise all purposivist antisubordi-
nation theories.343
342 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (GinsburgJ., concurring).
343 Id.
344 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 117.
345 ,Purposivism" interprets statutes "by identifying the purpose or objective of the
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Understanding the difference between a purposivist antisubordi-
nation theory and a textual formal equality theory is crucial to under-
standing what went wrong in Oncale. Franke is sharply critical of the
failure of courts to articulate a theory of why sexual harassment is sex
discrimination. Abrams, commenting on Oncale specifically, ex-
pressed frustration that Justice Scalia "offered no theory of the wrong
[of sexual harassment] that purports to explain why same-sex cases
should be included in Title VII's ambit."3 46 But the Oncale Court does
articulate a theory of sexual harassment. It happens to be a mechani-
cal, but clear-cut textual approach arguing that the wrong of harass-
ment is its violation of formal equality principles. In my view, what
Franke and Abrams actually want to criticize is the failure of courts,
like the Supreme Court in Oncale, to articulate a purposivist antisub-
ordination theory of why sexual harassment violates Title VII. This
raises a problem. Courts are not likely to move en masse toward adop-
tion of purposivist antisubordination arguments. There has never
been a controlling consensus in favor of antisubordination as the un-
derlying theory of employment discrimination law. At the same time,
in sexual harassment cases, courts have seemed more comfortable re-
lying on textual arguments. Moreover, there is a critical communica-
tion gap here: when an antisubordination theorist making a purposiv-
ist argument says "let's take a fresh look at causation in Title VII
cases," a textual, formal-equality-oriented court will understand "cau-
sation" in a very different way than what the antisubordination theo-
rists intended.
Antisubordination theory supplies a vital theoretical test for ar-
guments. Decisions based on this theory poke through the surface of
the case reports from time to time, but one has to acknowledge that
most of the time courts remain mesmerized by formal equality. Anti-
subordination arguments are the conscience of Title VII. Theorists
must continue to develop these arguments in order to wage the moral
battle for proper understanding of antidiscrimination law. But as a
practical matter, antisubordination theorists have to apply themselves
to the task of translating their arguments pragmatically into textual
arguments.
In Sexual Harassment of Working Women, MacKinnon asserts that the
statute, and then by determining which interpretation is most consistent with that pur-
pose or goal" even where the interpretation causes the statute to "evolve to meet new
problems." ESKRIDGE, supra note 340, at 25-26.
346 Abrams, supra note 126, at 1258.
347 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
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formal equality and antisubordination approaches "can be mutually
supporting, each reaching the same result.,148 By offering both a for-
mal equality and an antisubordination argument, and showing how
they work together, MacKinnon was not simply touching all the bases,
but also illustrating the importance of proceeding on two tracks in a
legal system that has been-and may be fundamentally-relatively in-
hospitable to purposivist antisubordination arguments. I do not agree
that the other track has to be a formal equality approach; MacKinnon
may have wrongly assumed that a textual argument is always a formal
equality argument. For feminists, any theory of sexual harassment
should meet both a "textual" and a "purposivist" test: is it consistent
with the statutory language "discrimination because of sex," and is it
grounded in Tide VII's antisubordination purpose?
349
C. "Because of Sex" as the Next Theoretical Challenge for Textual
Antisubordination Arguments
If, as I argue, the general challenge for antisubordination theo-
rists is to proceed on a textual track, the specific challenge is to de-
velop a theory of causation-a definition of "because of'-,that, as far
as possible, maps antisubordination principles onto the text of "dis-
crimination because of sex." This would allow judges and juries to
identify sex-discriminatory harassing conduct without requiring them
first to become cutting-edge "second generation" theorists of sexual
harassment. The best bet, in my view, is to persuade courts to take a
more expansive view of the phrase "because of' that moves away from
a subjective motivation theory of intentional discrimination. The jus-
tification for a lower causation threshold has already been suggested:
because harassing conduct inherently lacks legitimate business justifi-
cation, there is less demand on the causation inquiry to serve its:gate-
348 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 105. MacKinnon uses the term "differences" to
mean what I have called "formal equality," and "inequality" to mean what I have called
"antisubordination." Id. at 101-02.
349 There is not a strict logical correlation between a particular approach to statu-
tory interpretation and antisubordination or formal equality theory. In the Title VII
context, both formal equality and antisubordination theorists can advance purposivist
arguments. (Then-) Justice Rehnquist's dissent in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
is in part a purposivist articulation of a colorblind theory of discrimination: "We have
never wavered in our understanding that Title VII 'prohibits all racial discrimination in
employment, without exception for any group of particular employees."' 443 U.S. 193,
220 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976)).
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keeping function in harassment cases.5
One approach would be to lower the threshold of intentionality to
establish causation. As Linda Krieger has suggested, one could rea-
sonably interpret the language of Title VII as requiring a plaintiff to
establish only that "his or her protected status 'made a difference' or
'played a role' in a challenged employment decision."352 Indeed, the
plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse states that "because of sex" means" • ,353
"that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. This may
boil down to little more than a looser version of the "but for cause"
test that the Supreme Court has sometimes said is required in dis-
crimination cases. 54 The notion that sex was "relevant" to sexually
harassing behavior seems like an inviting concept for implementing
antisubordination theories of causation until one asks what evidence
would prove such "relevance." Any proposed legal standard of causa-
tion will be met with a skeptical question from courts: How could they
apply this standard in a way that would allow trial courts to grant
summary judgment in appropriate cases on the ground that causation
is not present? Perhaps a workable doctrine would provide for certain
kinds of facts raising a presumption of causation (because of sex) that
would shift the burden of production to the defendant to show that
sex was irrelevant to the harassing conduct. One example would be a
showing that a female plaintiff was in a workforce in which women
have been traditionally underrepresented.
Another approach would be to view the sex-basis of a claim from
the vantage point of the plaintiff rather than the defendant. Linguis-
tically, "because of" does not necessarily mean "motivated by." If one
views "discrimination" as an injurious act or course of conduct, sex
can be a "cause" of that injury not only if the actor's motivation was
the plaintiffs sex, under the traditional view, but also if the plaintiff
experienced injurious conduct "because of her sex." The court in Doe
expressed something like this concept when it spoke of a hypothetical
plaintiff for whom "the work environment would be rendered hos-
tile... as a woman."3 1 Similarly, in Brown v. Henderson, the court sug-
35o Supra Part I.B.3.
351 See Lawrence, supra note 64, at 323 (arguing that equal protection law should
redress unconscious race discrimination); Oppenheimer, supra note 64, at 917-19 (ex-
amining the potential for negligence liability in discrimination cases).
352 Krieger, supra note 60, at 1168.
353 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1988).
354 Supra Parts I.B.1-2.
355 Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,578 (7th Cir. 1997).
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gested a victim-focused notion of causation in stating that "a woman
might be abused in ways that cannot be explained without reference
to her sex, notwithstanding the fact that a man received treatment at
least as harsh, though for other-non-sexual-reasons."3 56  This
broader understanding of the meaning of "because of' may be im-
plicit in the commonly used substitute in judicial decisions, "based
on," as in "discrimination based on sex."35 7 Oncale itself refers to dis-
crimination and harassment "on the basis of sex."358 To be sure, one
can object to the foregoing suggestions, but the particular flaws of the
suggestions do not detract from the argument that some work is nec-
essary in order to expand the notion of causation in sexual harass-
ment cases.
V. REVIVING THE SEX PER SE RULE
The sex per se rule is not in itself an articulate antisubordination
theory. It is instead a stand-in doctrine that furthers the aims of anti-
subordination theory while solving certain practical problems. Spe-
cifically, it allows courts and juries to determine, without difficult fac-
tual or theoretical inquiry, that a particular category of conduct is
"because of sex" and to move on quickly to the issues of severity. The
foregoing Section suggests that the sex per se rule should be justified,
not only as consistent with antisubordination theory, as argued above,
but also based on a textual argument. After the critiques of the sex
per se rule in the Franke and Schultz articles, and more pointedly, af-
ter the disapproval of that rule in Oncale, it is no longer enough to say,
"of course sexual harassment is based on sex; what else can it be based
on?" A textual argument, if it was not needed previously, is certainly
needed now.
A. Theoretical and TextualJustifications for Reviving the Sex Per Se Rule
Franke has observed that the statement of the sex per se rule in
36 257 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2001).
357 See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 523 U.S. 843, 846 (2001)
(noting in Title VII case that the "Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the rec-
ord demonstrated that DuPont employees engaged in flagrant discrimination based on
sex"); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that "sexual harass-
ment is ordinarily based on sex"). A LEXIS search for "discrimination based on sex" in
the federal caselaw database as of April 29, 2002, would yield more than 1000 cases.
3 8 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); seeValdes,
supra note 27, at 12, 16-17 (arguing that sexual orientation and gender are fundamen-
tally "sex-based").
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the lower courts has been "a mere conclusion posing as an argument,"
and a sign of judicial laziness."' Lazy or not, were the courts onto
something in finding it plain that sexual conduct in the workplace is
"because of sex"? Schultz and Franke both appear to have assumed
that the MacKinnonist "sex equals sexism" theory provides the only
theoretical argument for the proposition that sexual conduct is inher-
ently "because of sex"; neither attempted to look beyond MacKinnon
for other arguments. A starting point for considering other argu-
ments would be to ask the question in reverse: is it theoretically
sound to assert that there is some sexual conduct that is not "because
of sex"? I think not.
To begin with, sexual conduct, whatever its motivation (desire or
something else), occurs not between theoretical constructs-biologi-
cal males and females lacking gender identity, or free-floating gender-
role spirits-but between real people who display a complex mixture
359 Franke, supra note 13, at 720. The Doe opinion is a unique exception: there,
the court struggled mightily to place the sex per se rule on firmer theoretical footing.
Judge Rovner's opinion seemed to work outward from the common sense insight that
"[firankly, we find it hard to think of a situation in which someone intentionally grabs
another's testicles for reasons entirely unrelated to that person's gender." Doe, 119
F.3d at 580. The court questioned "why such proof [of differential treatment or ex-
press sex animus] is needed when the harassment has explicit sexual overtones." Id. at
576. The court seemed aware of the notion that sexual conduct derives its meaning
from a context in which sex and gender make a difference; it noted that "in each case
[involving sexual conduct,] the victim's gender... affects how he or she will experi-
ence that harassment; and in anything short of a truly unisex society, men's and
women's experiences will be different. In that sense, each arguably is the victim of sex
discrimination." Id. at 578. The court went on to observe that a harassment victim be-
comes a "sexual object" whose job is conditioned on her "willingness to endure har-
assment that is inseparable from her gender." Id. at 579 (citations omitted). Harass-
ing sexual conduct, the court observed, is "humiliating in a deeply personal way, as
only sexual acts can be," and is "a grave intrusion upon [the plaintiff's] sexual privacy."
Id. at 580.
Unfortunately, these articulate intuitions in the opinion never really coalesced
into a theory of why sexual conduct is per se "because of sex." In many parts of the
opinion, the Doe court seemed to strive for a broader understanding of causation, in
which "because of sex" means "a nexus between the harassment and the plaintiffs
gender" and extends to any "harassment that is in some way linked to the plaintiffs sex."
Id. at 570 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). However, the court circled around
the issue and ultimately fell back on a particularly strong fact pattern that was rife with
explicit language showing that the harassers targeted H. Doe because he was not suffi-
ciently masculine. Thus, "when one's genitals are grabbed, when one is denigrated in
gender-specific language, and when one is threatened with sexual assault, it would seem to
us impossible to de-link the harassment from the gender of the individual harassed."
Id. at 580 (emphasis added). At the end of the day, the court was able to fall back on
the harassers' gender-specific language-a clear indicator of a sex-based intent-and
concluded that it "need not so decide" that sexual conduct is per se because of sex. Id.
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of biological sex and gender and who perceive and make assumptions
about these same traits in the other. Such acts may be purged of
much of their meaning if biological sex is removed from view. It is
one thing to say, as Franke does, that maleness and femaleness are not
opposites but rather are "two locations on a spectrum of sexual and
gendered identity" ;36 it is quite another thing to say that maleness and
femaleness are irrelevant or invisible to sexual actors. This point is
even stronger if one conceives "sex" under Title VII as something
more than mere biological sex, as Franke and others have argued it
361should be. I would venture to say that we are more acutely aware of
the sex and gender identities of others (regardless of whether they are
actual or perceived) when we act sexually toward them than at most
other times, whether the sexual act is an expression of desire or
power.
Indeed, the notion that all sexual conduct is "because of sex" flows
in some ways from Franke's own arguments. Franke argues persua-
sively that gender identity is constructed in a dialectical fashion; a
sexual act creates and reinforces the gender of the person acting and
the person acted upon."' This argument has two further implications.
First, sexual conduct cannot be understood independently of the
gender of the persons involved. Second, the relationship between
gender and any instance of sexual conduct is one of both cause and
effect; sexual conduct is necessarily "because of' the gender of all per-
sons involved. Again, since "gendered" beings are located in "sexed"
bodies, "because of gender" also necessarily implies "because of
,,363
sex.
These principles apply whether or not the act is one of sexual de-
sire. Franke cites research of the psychologist John Pryor, who con-
cluded "that men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace
primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire."364 Viewed
through the lens of Franke's theory of sexual harassment as a "tech-
nology" for regulating gender and promoting heteropatriarchy, it
would appear that most, if not all, sexual conduct in the workplace not
360 Franke, supra note 13, at 758.
361 Franke, supra note 26, at 8, 95-98; see also supra note 207 (explaining how the
sex-gender distinction was blurred in the dictionary definitions of those terms in the
early 1960s, when Title VII was first enacted).
362 See Franke, supra note 13, at 763 (arguing that sexual harassment is sexist be-
cause "it solidifies what 'real men' and 'real women' should be").
363 SeeValdes, supra note 27, at 12 ("[E]very person's sex is also that person's gen-
der.").
364 Franke, supra note 13, at 743 (citations omitted).
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expressing desire is nevertheless because of sex. Take the example of
telling sexual jokes or posting pornographic pictures in an all-male oil
rig or fire station. This type of sexual conduct functions as a sort of
waving of a flag of heteropatriarchy, calling upon the audience to sa-
lute. Those who do not salute can be identified as gender traitors and
treated accordingly. This conduct is "because of sex" irrespective of
whether anyone is offended by it, let alone severely abused or op-
pressed, although the latter reaction is necessary to make a federal
case.
Although, as I see it, a sex per se rule is not only consistent with,
but actually follows from Franke's argument, she herself seems to re-
treat from this implication of her own theory in drawing lines among
the same-sex harassment cases. Franke identifies three categories: (1)
a gay male supervisor makes sexual advances toward a male subordi-
nate; (2) a non-gay (either heterosexual or not alleged to be gay) har-
asser engages in sexual conduct that humiliates "or otherwise victim-
ize [s]" the plaintiff, "[r] ather than sexually objectifying" him; (3) the
plaintiff (like category two) was not the harasser's sex object, but was
victimized because of his gender identity, for failing to conform to the
hetero-masculine gender expectations of the defendant or the work-
place. 365 The first category, a same-sex harassment version of a reverse
discrimination claim, has had the most consistent success in the
courts, because it satisfies the "sexual desire" interpretation of "be-
cause of sex," but Franke persuasively argues that under her antisub-
ordination theory, it is not sex discrimination. 366 The third category of
cases are the core of Franke's revision of the antisubordination theory,
and she argues that these should be seen as clear-cut violations of Ti-
de VII. 367 The second category-the "straight-on" same-sex harass-
ment case, as it were-for Franke represents "the most difficult chal-
lenge to my, or any, theory of sex discrimination."' 68 Franke
reluctantly concludes that these plaintiffs, although they have suffered
harm, have no cause of action under Title VII: even though "there is
a gendered orthodoxy" at work in such harassment, they are not inju-
365 Id. at 696-98.
366 Id. at 766-67. Franke suggests as "a middle ground between grand and meager
theory" that these cases be actionable as "Title VII disparate treatment" cases, but not
as sexual harassment cases. Id. I frankly do not understand either what she means by a
"disparate treatment" case in this context or why such doctrinal treatment represents a
.middle ground."
367 Id. at 770-71.
36 Id. at 768.
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riously "gendered" by it.-69
Interestingly, Franke classified the Fifth Circuit's decision in On-
cale in this nonactionable category; her initial interpretation of Oncale
as a nonactionable "type two" case illustrates the problematic quality
of her rejection of a sex per se rule.37 Why banish a claim like Joseph
Oncale's from Title VII law? Franke elsewhere states that masculinity
and femininity are not two opposite poles, but ends of a continuum of
gender. Why then does Oncale get lumped together with "the
guys"-the same guys who are threatening to rape him? If gender is a
question of degree, the sexual hazing directed at Oncale by non-gay
harassers should be powerful prima facie evidence that he is not at the
point of the gender spectrum where his harassers demand that he be.
Plaintiffs in type-two cases are not different from type-three plaintiffs:
they suffer what Franke should recognize as a gender injury. The
gender-policing purpose or effect of sexualized harassment by other
heterosexual males may be less obvious when the victim is heterosex-
ual than if he were an openly gay man or transgendered or transsex-
ual, but in view of Franke's notion of a spectrum of gender, this
should be a difference of degree and not of kind. While sexual con-
duct, certainly, is far from the only harassing conduct that may be be-
cause of sex, a showing that the conduct is sexual should be enough to
cross the causation threshold.
One final point: Schultz has asserted that sexual conduct should
not be a "bright line" test for causation because courts have experi-
enced difficulty in determining what conduct is sexual. In a similar
vein, Susan Estrich has argued that courts tend to err in favor of de-
fendants by finding conduct to be nonsexual. 31' However, these ar-
369 Id. Franke does allow that such plaintiffs could bootstrap their harassment
claim into a Title VII claim if they first object to the harassment as perpetuating gen-
der orthodoxy, and the harassment continues as "some form of penalty for making
that unwelcomeness known." Id. at 768-69.
370 Franke, supra note 13, at 697 n.17. I should not be understood as suggesting
that there is anything inconsistent between Franke's characterization of the Fifth Cir-
cuit decision in Oncale in her law review article and her commendable and well-argued
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Oncale. To begin with, her classification of On-
cale in the article did not involve explicit discussion of the case, but only its inclusion in
a string cite of "type two" cases. She might not have considered it a type-two case on
further scrutiny or as it was framed in the Supreme Court. Moreover, advocates and
amici have to take advantage of issues that arise in the Supreme Court as and when
they arise; the facts of the cases on which the Supreme Court grants certiorari are not
always ideal.
7 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 840 (1991) ("[C]ourts tend
to define 'sexual' very narrowly, based on a man's view of a man's acts.").
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guments do not provide a valid objection to a sex per se rule. Hold-
ing that sexual conduct is per se "because of sex" is not to hold non-
sexual conduct as falling outside of Tide VII's prohibition of harass-
ment. It simply recognizes that in a subcategory of cases, the plaintiff
will be relieved of having to produce separate evidence of causation.
The fact that some individual cases will create problems of categoriza-
tion-is the conduct sexual or not?-is no objection either, but is
rather a problem endemic to all rules and standards in the law. Nei-
ther of these objections provides a persuasive reason why proof should
be made more difficult for those plaintiffs who, like Lois Robinson,
have been harassed by conduct that is indisputably sexual.
B. Applications
The sex per se rule could take the form of a conclusive presump-
tion that sexual conduct is "because of sex" as a matter of law, which is
how courts seemed to treat the issue prior to Oncale. Alternatively, the
rule could raise a rebuttable presumption, shifting to the defendant
the burden of producing evidence that the sexual conduct was not be-
cause of sex-however the latter concept is defined in harassment
cases. In this Section, I discuss three other issues relating to the appli-
cation of a sex per se rule. First, I will attempt to distinguish Oncale,
which seems to reject such a rule. Second, I will examine how a sex
per se rule would help resolve cases of discrimination on account of
"sexual orientation." Finally, I will examine how a sex per se rule
would help resolve cases involving an "equal opportunity harasser."
1. Distinguishing Oncale
Oncale's rejection of a sex per se rule is sufficiently unclear that
courts can, with a straight face, revive it in response to a sufficiently
persuasive argument. Oncale makes three references to a sex per se
rule. It is first mentioned as the third in a "bewildering variety of
stances" lower courts have taken in same-sex harassment cases: "Still
other[ decisions] suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in
content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual
orientation, or motivations.""' The court declined to adopt any of the
"stances" mentioned, but Doe, to which the Court cited, is significant
372 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). The Court
then cited Judge Rovner's opinion in Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.
1997).
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because it was summarily vacated and remanded by the Court for re-
consideration in light of Oncale even though, like Oncale, it allowed a
same-sex claim to go forward.
73
Adding to the implication of disapproval are two subsequent
statements. "We have never held that workplace harassment, even
harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or• ,374
connotations. And, in discussing the "evidentiary routes" for prov-
ing causation, the Court mentions "explicit or implicit proposals of
sexual activity" presumably "motivated by sexual desire."373
Arguably these statements are ambiguous in their posture toward
the sex per se rule. Clearly, the Court does not adopt such a rule, but
does Oncale preclude it? To say that conduct that is sexual in content
is not "always actionable" may only refer to the principle that harass-
ing conduct must be severe or pervasive. This statement thus leaves
open the possibility that sexual conduct is presumptively "because of
sex," insofar as actionable sexual harassment must be not only "be-
cause of sex" but also severe or pervasive. Similarly, to say that words
with sexual connotation are not "discrimination because of sex" fol-
lows the same logic: Sexual language is arguably "because of sex" but
not automatically "discrimination because of sex," since the latter,
again, requires a showing of severe or pervasive harassment. To be
sure, an argument can be made that the Court's pronouncements, al-
though themselves ambiguous, tend in context to show an intent to
reject the sex per se rule. However, as Justice Scalia himself, the opin-
ion's author, has said elsewhere, "we think it generally undesirable,
where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect sentences of
the United States Reports as though they were the United States
Code." 76
2. Discrimination on Account of "Sexual Orientation"
A sex per se rule would recognize many of the same-sex claims
where harassment was aimed at gender nonconformists. Typically,
these cases involve explicitly sexual taunts and sexualized physical
abuse. For those (myself included) who believe that reverse discrimi-
nation cases should be disfavored under antidiscrimination laws, a sex
373 City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
374 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
375 Id.
376 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
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per se rule has one problematic feature: it will do nothing to prevent
claims targeting gay harassers. Nevertheless, it will not recognize
more such claims than are already recognized by Oncale, which em-
braces a sexual desire theory of causation under which proof of the
harasser's homosexuality will establish "because of sex."
Significantly, there is a growing recognition that harassment of
gender nonconformists violates Title VII even in the absence of a sex
per se rule. Franke and others have persuasively argued that the law
of sex discrimination has conflated such concepts as biological sex,
gender, and sexual behavior. Paradoxically, when pressed to reason
beyond the logical and cultural limits of the "sex system" (the law's
limited conceptions of sex and gender)-for example, as Taylor Flynn
has argued, in transgender litigation-courts tend to fall back on a
crabbed definition of "sex" as referring to biological sex or, more spe-•. I• 378
cifically, sex as defined by external genitalia. Franke is rightfully
critical of such a crabbed view of sex discrimination. Among other
reasons to reject a biologically deterministic conception of "sex" in
construing Title VII, is that this very conflation of sex and gender was
undoubtedly at work when Title VII was enacted-there was no notion
that the two were different. Thus, employment discrimination against
a class of persons on account of a "mismatch" between their sex and
their gender is discrimination because of sex.
The Oncale court, in my view, bent over backwards to avoid stating
legal standards that would lead to protection of lesbians and gays from
discrimination on account of sexual orientation discrimination. But I
believe that regressive effort must fail in the foreseeable future. On-
cale's very emphasis on "because of sex" as the touchstone of sex dis-
crimination works against the exclusion of lesbians and gays. Simply
put: "When individuals are sexually harassed because of the sex of
their sexual partners, real or imagined, they are harassed because of
sex.... If their own gender, or that of their loved ones, were different,
they would not be so treated."3 7 9 Discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is thus, in the plainest of language, discrimination on the
basis of sex within the terms of Title VII.
Some courts have begun to apply such a theory, under a sex-
stereotyping rubric, in cases that could be characterized as discrimina-
tion on account of sexual orientation. For instance, in Higgins v. New
377 Eg., Franke, supra note 26, at 9-14; Valdes, supra note 27.
78 Flynn, supra note 27, at 394-96.
379 MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at 27.
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Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,380 the court considered the Title VII claim of
a gay employee alleging sex discrimination on account of his sexual
orientation. The court of appeals "regard [ed] it as settled law that, as
drafted and authoritatively construed, Title VII does not proscribe
harassment simply because of sexual orientation."38 ' Nevertheless, the
court stated in dicta:
Oncale confirms that the standards of liability under Title VII, as they
have been refined and explicated over time, apply to same-sex plaintiffs
just as they do to opposite-sex plaintiffs. In other words, just as a woman
can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her be-
cause she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man
can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against
him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity."
2
In Schwenk v. Hartford,383 the court applied Price Waterhouse to de-
termine that a male-to-female transsexual inmate raped by a prison
guard could state a claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act. 384
Applying Title VII principles, the court found that "the evidence of-
fered by [plaintiff] Schwenk tends to show that [the guard] Mitchell's
actions were motivated, at least in part, by Schwenk's gender-in this
case, by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically mascu-
line appearance or demeanor. ",35 According to the court,
under Price Waterhouse, "sex" under Title VII encompasses both sex-that
is, the biological differences between men and women-and gender.
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or
woman is forbidden under Title VII.... [B]oth statutes [GMVA and Ti-
tle VII] prohibit discrimination based on gender as well as sex. Indeed,
for purposes of these two acts, the terms "sex" and "gender" have be-. 386
come interchangeable.
380 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
381 Id. at 259.
382 Id. at 261 n.4 (citation omitted). The statement is dictum insofar as the court
rejected these arguments, not on the merits, but on the procedural ground that they
were not raised or factually developed in the district court and could not be raised for
the first time on appeal.
383 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
384 The GMVA was enacted as subtitle C of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). This section was ruled unconstitutional in United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
385 204 F.3d at 1202. Although this cause of action under the GMVA was ruled un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598, nothing in Morrison
undermines the Ninth Circuit's reasoning about the relationship between sex and
gender in discrimination cases generally or Title VII in particular.
386 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
WHEN IS SEX BECA USE OF SEX?
Courts that continue to reject harassment and discrimination
claims by gays, lesbians, and transgendered persons necessarily rea-
son-some quite explicitly-in one of two ways. Either they decide
that "sexual orientation"3 8 7 is the "only" motivation for the discrimina-
tion or harassment, or they reason in effect that discrimination against
someone on account of their sexual orientation is a kind of loophole
or "safe harbor" that can legalize conduct that would otherwise be un-
lawful sex discrimination.388 Here the reasoning seems to be that be-
cause Congress rejected inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination in Title VII, the statute must be
construed to make such discrimination legal.38 9
The first argument has been refuted by Francisco Valdes, who has
shown how it makes no sense to argue that sexual orientation is ever
the "only" basis for discrimination. For one thing, sexual orientation
is always fundamentally based on either sex or gender: it can only be
defined with reference to the sex or gender of a person vis-a-vis the
sex or gender of those with whom he or she is sexual.39 0 For another,
sexual orientation is only one of several facets of gendered 
behavior;3 91
harassers who target gender nonconformists often themselves conflate
sexual orientation and other aspects of gendered behavior. Such har-
assers may indeed know or even assume nothing about the sexuality of
the person they harass, instead focusing on other gender-coded as-
pects of the victim's personal appearance or demeanor.
387 Again, I use the term advisedly. As Valdes shows, as courts use it, sexual orien-
tation is a conflation of beliefs about an individual's sexual intimacies and that per-
son's gender identity. Valdes, supra note 27, at 135-36.
388 Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000). There,
the court, analogizing a claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to Title VII,
held that the male plaintiff, a cross-dressing loan applicant, could establish that the
bank's refusal to give him a loan application was discriminatory if it was based on his
cross-dressing (and assuming that women dressing like men were not refused loan ap-
plications). However, the court reasoned, if the refusal was because the loan officer
believed the plaintiff was gay, there would be no claim.
389 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that
Congress, on many occasions, has rejected "bills that would have extended Title VII's
protection to people based on their sexual preferences"); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not afford a cause of action
for discrimination based upon sexual orientation."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
against homosexuals."); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual
preference such as homosexuality.").
390 Valdes, supra note 27, at 15.
391 Id.
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Moreover, whether justifying a Title VII loophole for sexual orien-
tation discrimination on the grounds that it excludes other motiva-
tions or as a "safe harbor," the effect is to exclude gays and lesbians
from the protection of a law of general application, to which they are
presumptively entitled. Romer v. Evans 31 held that equal protection
was violated by a law that excluded lesbians and gays from "the protec-
tion of generally applicable laws and policies." 393 Therefore, equal
protection is violated if gays and lesbians are excluded from a law al-
ready on the books that would protect them but for their sexual orien-
394tation. In light of Romer, the current interpretation of Title VII pur-
porting to exclude sexual orientation discrimination from its
prohibition cannot stand for long.
3. The Equal Opportunity or "Bisexual" Harasser
The problem of the equal opportunity harasser portended by On-
cale has emerged as something more than a law school hypothetical.
Some recent cases have dismissed claims where the harasser allegedly
targeted both male and female employees.9 But the equal opportu-
nity harasser problem also may extend to such core sexual harassment
cases as Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards.396 Few would contest the no-
tion that the wrong of sexual harassment, however it is defined,
should include what was done to Lois Robinson. The harassment she
endured, summarized at the outset of this Article, was particularly
egregious. Yet without a sex per se rule, Oncale's formal equality ap-
proach would have given the employer Jacksonville Shipyards an
equal opportunity harasser defense. The sexualized hazing was so
pervasive at the shipyard that one easily could imagine the employer
putting up two or three male employees to testify that they, too, felt
offended and harassed. Some courts have begun to recognize, how-
ever, that it is possible for a single harasser to discriminate against
both men and women.3 97 An important advance will occur if and
392 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
393 Id. at 630-35.
394 See Valdes, supra note 27, at 192 ("Tide VII formally forbids discrimination
based on sex and gender stereotyping, but on the statute's face this protection is not
limited to members of the sexual majority."); Cf MacKinnon Brief, supra note 127, at
28-30 (arguing that excluding same-sex claims from Title VII coverage would violate
equalprotection).
39PSupra Part II.B.3; see also Hbert, supra note 154, at 476-79 (discussing harass-
ment that targeted men and women in the same case).
396 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
397 See Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "the
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when courts accept the notion argued in various antisubordination
theories, including those discussed here, that employees can be dis-
criminated against on account of their gender. This would broaden
the comparative treatment inquiry beyond treatment of "men" and
"women" to comparative treatment of hetero-masculine men and oth-
ers.
The sex per se rule would eliminate the "bisexual harasser" prob-
lem for claims involving sexual conduct, since all sexual conduct is
"because of sex." The plaintiffs in Holman, for instance, would have
established causation under a sex per se rule and would have pre-
vailed if they could have established the severity elements. Assuming a
"bisexual harasser" is someone who is "impartial" to the sexual or
gender identity of the target, the harassment is nevertheless because
of sex: "Impartial" is not the same as "oblivious."
CONCLUSION
Both the Supreme Court and the second generation theorists of
sexual harassment have discredited the sex per se rule, not out of any
conscious intent to make proof more difficult for Lois Robinson, but
rather to address other issues. For feminist theorists, the challenge
was to find a unifying antisubordination theory that could at the same
time bring both H. Doe and Lois Robinson under the same protective
Title VII umbrella. For the Supreme Court, however, the agenda
seems to have been to make proof more difficult for H. Doe in order
to prevent Title VII from drifting toward prohibition of harassment
because of sexual orientation. But abandonment of the sex per se
rule would seem to leave the Lois Robinsons standing out in the
rain-a result intended by neither feminist theorists nor indeed the
Court.
Oncale clearly shows us that courts will continue to look to the
words of the statute for doctrinal guidance in understanding Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of' sex. The resulting fo-
cus on the words "because of' means that courts will continue to take
the question of causation seriously. Causation, which in antidiscrimi-
nation law means the intent to discriminate, is after all one of the
application of discriminatory policies to individuals cannot be justified by their even-
handed effects on women and men as classes or in the aggregate"); Steiner v. Show-
boat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[E]ven if [the supervisor]
used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading manner against
male employees, he cannot thereby 'cure' his conduct toward women.").
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gatekeeping mechanisms that separates employer actions that are law-
ful from those that may violate Title VII. The sex per se rule has
helped combat the subordination of women in the workplace by eas-
ing otherwise potentially difficult problems in proving causation, par-
ticularly in cases like Robinson, and it could function in the same way
to combat subordination based on gender more broadly conceived.
After Oncale, the first order of business for theorists of sexual harass-
ment law should be to rehabilitate the sex per se rule by showing
courts that it has a theoretical and textual basis. If courts are taking
causation seriously, then those of us who believe that the antidiscrimi-
nation laws are fundamentally laws against subordination of tradition-
ally disadvantaged groups must take the causation issue seriously as
well. We ignore it at our peril, and, more pointedly, at the peril of
those whom we hope the antidiscrimination laws will protect.
